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  ABSTRACT	  This	  theoretical	  study	  explores	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  anxiety	  and	  how	  it	  has	  been	  understood,	  articulated	  and	  treated	  over	  time	  in	  psychoanalysis.	  Formulations	  of	  anxiety	  in	  classical	  theory,	  object	  relations,	  attachment,	  interpersonal,	  relational	  and	  trauma	  theory	  will	  be	  explored,	  offering	  a	  counterpoint	  to	  the	  current	  medical	  model	  in	  which	  anxiety	  is	  primarily	  understood	  as	  a	  symptom	  to	  be	  eradicated	  through	  medication	  and	  “evidence	  based”	  treatments.	  The	  study	  argues	  that	  anxiety	  only	  exists	  within	  a	  relational	  and	  systemic	  context,	  and	  that	  reducing	  anxiety	  to	  a	  set	  of	  discrete	  disorders	  requiring	  prescriptive	  treatment	  protocols	  often	  overlooks	  the	  complexity	  of	  individual	  experience	  and	  need	  as	  well	  as	  discounting	  psychodynamic	  treatment	  options	  that	  are	  also	  effective.	  Finally	  the	  study	  will	  end	  with	  a	  composite	  case	  study	  that	  further	  illustrates	  the	  theories	  discussed,	  and	  that	  also	  demonstrates	  the	  functions	  and	  meanings	  of	  anxiety	  within	  a	  relational	  context.	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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
 
 
. . . I believe that it is fairly safe to say that anybody and everybody 
devotes much of his lifetime, a great deal of his energy . . . and a good part 
of his efforts in dealing with others to avoiding more anxiety than he 
already has and, if possible, to getting rid of this anxiety (Sullivan, 1953 
P.11). 
 
If one embraces Sullivan’s understanding of anxiety as central, if not the central, 
phenomenon shaping human behavior and relationships, then the study of anxiety, its 
functions, and its role in clinical work would seem to be indispensable.  
Various psychoanalytic theories from Freud onwards have grappled with theorizations of 
anxiety and its role in human development and relationships.  These include ego 
psychology, object relations, and attachment theory as well as contemporary relational 
and trauma theory among others. An examination of these theories will offer insight into 
the etiology of anxiety, its adaptive functions in development and survival, its underlying 
role in many types of pathology, as well as the ways that it informs clinical practice. 
Anxiety and its functions, like all affective experience, remains intangible and difficult to 
define, and in this sense always remains beyond explanation or theorization. Perhaps the 
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ongoing preoccupation with anxiety as a phenomenon within psychology and mental 
health is rooted not only on the ubiquitous nature of its presence, but in the impossibility 
of defining its place and function.  
Despite the elusive nature of anxiety and the complex and often contradictory 
ways that anxiety has been understood within psychoanalysis, few concepts have been 
more central to the development of the field of psychology, including its most recent 
incarnation within a medical model. Currently, forms of anxiety are the most commonly 
diagnosed set of discrete disorders (second only to depression) within the medical model 
that dominates mental health practices in the United States and most other parts of the 
world.  
This theoretical study is concerned with examining psychoanalytic formulations 
of anxiety that challenge the current hegemonic notion of anxiety as a discrete disorder, 
positing it instead as an integral aspect of human development and relationships. Chapter 
I examines the scope of anxiety as a disorder within the medical model, its prevalence 
and the populations it effects, as well as the treatment practices most commonly used to 
reduce or to eradicate it as a symptom. This chapter will also provide a literature review 
of various empirical or evidence-based studies conducted on anxiety disorders and their 
treatment. The chapter will focus on the empirical viability of psychodynamically 
oriented treatments compared to behaviorally oriented treatments such as CBT or the use 
of psychiatric medications that have become the treatments of choice within most mental 
health systems in the United States and internationally.  
Chapter II will then trace the history of key psychoanalytic formulations of 
anxiety that inform current treatment practices. The chapter will begin with classical 
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Freudian theories about anxiety along with Melanie Klein’s object relations framework. 
Anxiety in Winnicott’s self-psychology and Bowlby’s attachment theory will also be 
examined. Chapter III will explore how theorizations of anxiety inform the increasingly 
dyadic focus of Harry Stack Sullivan’s interpersonal theory.  The next section of this 
chapter will examine how relational theorists such as Stephen Mitchell integrate object 
relations and attachment theories with interpersonal theory creating a dyadic and 
decentered approach in which anxiety can only exists within a relational matrix. Phil 
Bromberg’s relational conception of multiple self-states and processes of dissociation 
will also be explored. 
In the final discussion, Chapter IV, I will use a composited case study drawn from 
experiences in my most recent placement at a college mental health center in order to 
illustrate the theories previously discussed, with a focus on how anxiety functions and 
becomes an integral part of treatment within a relational psychodynamic approach.  One 
of the primary reasons I chose anxiety as a focus of this study is the very high prevalence 
of anxiety symptoms within this population and setting. The counseling center where I 
was placed was by definition a brief treatment clinic. This case study will also explore the 
ways that systemic expectations and demands shape treatment options as well as the 
kinds of enactment, rupture, and repair that are a central feature of psychoanalytic 
treatment. In conclusion, this chapter ends with an argument for the necessity of a range 
of treatment options that both reduce anxiety as a symptom, but that also offer 
alternatives to the dominant medical model that often rigidly defines forms of anxiety and 
provide corresponding treatment practices that do not necessarily meet the needs of the 
patient or the community of which they are part. 
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CHAPTER II 
On the Phenomenon of Anxiety 
 
Statement of Problem, Scope and Populations Affected 
The National Comorbidity Survey-Replication conducted from 2001-2003 to 
gather information on mental health disorders in the United States found that 28.8% of 
the general population meets criteria for at least one of the following anxiety disorders: 
panic disorder (PD), agoraphobia (AGO), social phobia (SAD), post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD), and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) (Himle et al, 2008). According 
to an analysis of the NCS-R data by Kessler et al. prior to the release of the DSM-V, 
anxiety disorders have one of the highest rates of lifetime prevalence second only to 
major depressive episodes (2012). The lifetime morbid risk (LMR) for a major depressive 
episode is 16.6% while the LMR for anxiety disorders is as follows: 15.6% for specific 
phobias, 10.7% for social phobia, 6.7% for social anxiety disorder (SAD), 5.7% for post 
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Kessler et. al, 2012). The less common anxiety 
disorders are generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) with an LMR of 4.3%, panic disorder 
(PD) without agoraphobia at 3.7%, agoraphobia with or without panic disorder (AGO) 
2.5% and obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) 2.3% (Kessler et. al, 2012) The 
diagnostic prevalence of anxiety disorders in the United States underscores the 
importance for social workers, policy makers, and other mental health professionals, of 
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understanding the etiology of anxiety, its clinical implications, and theoretical 
frameworks. 
In their research on psychodynamic treatments for anxiety disorders, Slavin-
Mulford and Hilsenroth (2012) write:  
Anxiety disorders are associated with severe impairments in functioning 
and have significant emotional and financial costs both on personal and 
societal levels. For example, patients with panic disorder have higher rates 
of morbidity and health care utilization than patients both with and 
without other psychiatric disorders leading them to account for 20% of all 
emergency room visits. Similarly, when compared with people suffering 
from 25 other mental disorders or common physical conditions, people 
with a diagnosis of GAD report missing the most work. Thus, given the 
high prevalence, impairment, and cost of anxiety disorders, it is essential 
to continue to develop and test treatments for anxiety (p. 117). 
 
According to the NCS-R and the Adolescent Supplement (NCS-A), Kessler et. al. 
found that anxiety disorders are common to both men and women, but that women are at 
increased risk for all anxiety disorders (2012). In the cases of GAD, AGO, SAD and 
PTSD, women reported close to or more than twice the lifetime prevalence to men for 
these disorders.  Most anxiety disorders have the highest lifetime prevalence for adults 
between the ages of 18 and 64. However, all population groups had the highest rate of 
onset for GAD, SAD, PD, PTSD and AGO in the late teens through the early twenties. 
Living below the poverty level, fewer years of education, and being divorced, separated, 
or never having married all increased the odds for different 12-month anxiety disorders. 
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Using the NCS-R data, several studies have also examined the rates of anxiety 
disorders among different ethnic and racial groups in the US.  Breslau et al. found that 
non-Hispanic whites had significantly higher rates of GAD compared to non-Hispanic 
blacks or Hispanics (2006). Whites also had higher rates of PD and SAD compared to 
other groups. In their comparative study of anxiety disorders in African Americans, non 
Hispanic whites, and Caribbean blacks, Himle et al. write that “Increased risk for most 
anxiety disorders among whites remains somewhat counterintuitive given increased 
social and economic stressors experienced by blacks” (2009). The authors posit several 
hypotheses to explain this phenomenon. The authors also found that, while the rates for 
anxiety disorders were lower in general among African-Americans and Caribbean blacks 
compared to whites, the lifetime prevalence for PTSD was higher for these two groups 
than for whites. Furthermore, Himle et al. found a significant correlation between 
race/ethnicity and the severity of mental illness for all anxiety disorders except 
agoraphobia (2009). Whites reported the lowest levels of functional impairment 
compared to African Americans and Caribbean blacks, and Caribbean blacks had the 
highest proportion of cases in the severe category (Himle et al., 2009). In another study 
that examined the relationship between race-based discrimination and non race-based 
discrimination and GAD, Soto et al. found that non race based discrimination was a 
predictor for GAD for all groups, but that in particular race-based discrimination was 
associated with higher odds for predicting lifetime GAD only for African Americans 
(2011). 
A fuller discussion of the complex relationship between race, gender, class, age, 
and anxiety disorders is beyond the scope of this phenomenon chapter, but the existing 
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data raises important questions about the socially constructed nature of mental illness, 
including anxiety disorders. Likewise, the data also raises important questions about the 
relationship between race, socio-cultural, and socio-economic factors, and how these 
inform etiology. The prevalence within different population groups may also be less an 
expression of the quality of lived experience and more an expression of how states of 
being are perceived by many individuals within groups and by the mental health 
professionals who treat them.  
Treatment for Anxiety Disorders 
While the identification of anxiety disorders and their diagnostic prevalence 
serves the useful function of framing their social and psychological significance and the 
need for treatments, these diagnoses also highlight the degree to which anxiety is now 
understood within a medical model. Anxiety as a phenomenon is predominantly thought 
of as a set of disorders with related symptomology. One result of this is a turn to 
psychiatric medication and/or cognitive behavioral therapies and interoceptive exposure 
therapies aimed at eradicating or reducing unwanted symptoms. Alongside the use of 
medications, CBT and other cognitive and exposure therapies are now considered the 
“gold standard” in the treatment of anxiety. One of the most widely studied treatment 
protocols developed by Barlow and Craske utilizes breathing retraining, cognitive 
restructuring, and in vivo exposure in addition to IE (interoceptive exposure) (2008).  
Several clinical trials have worked to demonstrate the efficacy of this treatment protocol, 
and several other studies add onto or recalibrate this protocol to improve outcomes in 
cases where the treatment is not effective (Welsh et al., 2010).  Cognitive behavioral 
therapies are now the most common form of treatment for anxiety in the United States 
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and abroad. An international comparison survey of different psychotherapeutic 
theoretical orientations demonstrated, with a few exceptions, that CBT is the most 
common treatment for anxiety in most parts of the world (Hoffman S. et al, 2010).  
In his book Crazy Like US: The Globalization of the American Psyche, Ethan 
Watters argues that through processes of globalization, Western mental health has now 
shaped the conceptualization of mental illness in most of the world such that the DSM 
has become the “worldwide standard” (2010). Watters (2010) writes that  
how people in a culture think about mental illnesses – how they categorize 
and prioritize the symptoms, attempt to heal them and set expectations for 
their course and outcome – influences the diseases themselves. In teaching 
the rest of the world to think like us, we have been, for better and worse, 
homogenizing the way the world goes mad (p. 2).  
While Watters is most concerned here with Western homogenization of mental illness, 
his logic can equally be applied to the United States and anxiety disorders. Indeed the 
conceptualization of anxiety as a set of individuated disorders based on certain 
symptomology, and the treatments used to target those symptoms, undoubtedly effects 
the prevalence and presentation of those disorders in America and how different 
population groups understand and experience the nature of their own mental health.  Yet 
it is important to point out that the specificity and prevalence of anxiety disorders not 
only reflects an “era of anxiety” and its dialectical relationship with the mental health 
classification system, but also the growing body of professional knowledge based on 
research and clinical experience that informs the constantly evolving nature of diagnosis 
and treatment. The diagnoses of Panic Disorder and Panic Disorder with Agoraphobia 
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only became distinct diagnostic categories differentiated from free-floating anxiety with 
the release of the DSM III in 1980 (Craske and Barlowe, 2008). The increasing precision 
of diagnostic criteria points to both the nuanced differentiation of clinical presentations 
over time and the evolving and contingent nature of diagnoses. Likewise, treatment 
options reflect the focus on and prioritization of certain symptoms.  
    Literature Review 
While there is ample research and clinical data demonstrating that CBT and 
medication can be effective in helping patients manage and reduce anxiety symptoms, the 
increasing focus on CBT and medication is part of the medical model’s prioritization of 
symptoms that often ignores the full complexity of individual biopsychosocial make-up. 
Furthermore, psychoanalytic formulations and treatments that may be equally if not more 
helpful to some patients than CBT are increasingly devalued and shunted aside for what 
are now viewed as more cost effective, evidence-based treatments.  
However, a recent comparative study of the longterm effects of CBT and Short 
Term Psychodynamic Therapy (STPP) for the treatment of GAD (generalized anxiety 
disorder) revealed that both produced large improvements at the 12 months follow up 
(Salzer et al, 2011).  However, in terms of worry and trait anxiety, CBT was found to be 
superior. The Hamilton anxiety scale was used as the primary measure, and treatments 
were carried out for both CBT and STPP according to manuals. The study began with 57 
participants diagnosed with GAD, and only 41 followed through with treatment until the 
12 month follow up. The small sample size of the study limits its generalizability, and the 
focus on worry and exposure to worry that is part of the focus in CBT raises the 
possibility that an increased focus on exposure to worry in STPP may improve outcomes 
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in terms of trait anxiety and worry. However, the authors also point out that, in 
psychodynamic therapy, worry is often conceived of as a defense that protects the client 
from other feelings or conflicts, and so the focus on worry itself would then become a 
distraction from emotional states and fantasies that are more threatening than the worries 
themselves (Salzer et al, 2011).  In this regard, a focus on symptom reduction as opposed 
to a broader range of affective experiences of self in relationships can also skew the 
perceived benefits of psychodynamic treatments. 
While there have been several studies of the efficacy of STPP for anxiety 
disorders, none of them were structured with sufficient inter-rater reliability to make 
them generalizable. In response to this lack of empirical stringency, Slavin-Mulford et al. 
(2011) designed the first study of the efficacy of STPP with acceptable inter rater 
reliability to examine how specific therapeutic techniques related to changes in anxiety 
disorder patients. The authors (2011) also point out that there have been few treatment 
studies that accurately examine the specific treatment strategies that produce patient 
change in CBT.  Slavin-Mulford et al. (2011) used the Comparative Psychotherapy 
Process Scale to assess fidelity to certain therapeutic techniques and how they produced 
change. Self-report scales for symptoms and level of functioning in different domains 
along with external therapist reports were used to determine the efficacy of treatment at 
various stages of therapy. Significant adaptive changes were found in anxiety symptoms, 
global symptoms distress, interpersonal distress as well as social occupational 
functioning. Over the course of treatment, 76% of patients reported anxiety symptoms 
within a normal distribution, which is an improvement over past CB and psychodynamic 
studies. Four therapeutic techniques in particular were meaningfully related to outcomes 
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(Slavin-Mulford et al., 2011). These include 1) focusing on wishes, fantasies, dreams and 
early memories; 2) linking current feelings to perceptions of the past; 3) highlighting 
patients typical patterns; 4) helping patients to understand their experiences in new ways. 
All of these techniques are consistent with psychodynamic theories. Like the previous 
study by Salzer at al. (2011), a limitation of this study is its generalizability due to the 
small sample size of 21 patients. Six of these patients were also stabilized on anxiolytic 
and/or antidepressant medication for three months prior to treatment, but were included 
in the study because they requested additional treatment to meet their personal goals. 
A 12-month comparison study by Ferrero et al. (2007) of brief psychodynamic, 
psychotherapy, and pharmacotherapy for patients diagnosed with GAD in a community 
setting, shed more light on the efficacy of medication and psychodynamic therapy. This 
study sample included 87 patients with GAD with or without an Axis I and Axis II 
comorbidity. The aim of the study was to assess the 6 month outcome of patients being 
treated with Brief Adlerian Psychodynamic Psychotherapy B-APP, a version of STPP, 
compared to pharmacologic treatment or combined treatment. There was also a 1-year 
follow up to determine the maintenance after six months of ending treatment. Multiple 
measures were used to track patient progress including the Clinical Global Impression 
(CGI), The Hamilton rating scale for anxiety and depression, The Social Occupation 
Functioning Scale (SOFAS) and The Verona Satisfaction Service Scale.  Because 
medication is currently the primary treatment offered to patients with GAD at most 
outpatient clinics due to the perceived expense of long term psychotherapy, Ferrero et al. 
(2007) wanted to assess the effectiveness of B-APP compared to medication alone or 
medication combined with therapy. Results showed that both therapy alone and 
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medication alone yielded relative good remission rates for GAD (67% and 63% 
respectively) at the one year mark. Medication combined with therapy yielded 80% 
remission rates at the one year mark. Of note, subjects with personality disorders who 
were treated with B-APP were more likely to exhibit improved socio-occupational skills. 
The authors conclude that B-APP is an effective monotherapy for GAD, and for patients 
with more severe GAD or a comorbid personality disorder, B-APP combined with 
medication is often most effective. One limitation of this study is that B-APP is non-
manualized, but the authors point out that some studies have demonstrated that non-
manualized treatments are as effective as manualized ones. Another limitation is the 
small sample size, even though this study has a much larger sample than most studies on 
the treatment of GAD. 
While all of these studies focus on the use of different forms of STPP, in another 
study conducted by Knekt et al. (2008), a group of 326 outpatients diagnosed with either 
an anxiety disorder or depression were randomly assigned to either STPP, solution 
focused therapy, or long term therapy in order to determine the efficacy of these 
treatments on work ability for patients with psychiatric disorders. In order to measure 
efficacy, the study used the Work Ability Index, (WAI), the Work Subscale (SAS-Work) 
of the Social Adjustment Scale (SAS-R), the perceived Psychological Functioning Scale, 
the prevalence of patients employed or studying, and the number of sick-leave days. The 
study found that work ability was significantly improved according to all of these 
measures during each phase of the 3-year follow up. There was no significant difference 
between the two kinds of short term therapy, but these two therapies showed 4-11% 
improved work ability at the 7 month follow up over long term therapy. At the second 
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year follow up there was no difference between therapies. However, at the third year 
follow up, test scores for long term therapy showed 5-12% improvement indicating that 
while short term therapies produce quicker improvement, long term therapies produce 
greater longevity of benefits over time. As with the other studies of psychodynamic 
therapy previously discussed here, due to ethical considerations there was no control 
group. Treatment was also not manualized, and whether or not this reduced reliability of 
the study remains a debated issue. 
A literature review by Blagys and Hilsenroth (2002) of existing comparative 
studies of CBT versus psychodynamic-interpersonal therapies (PI), aimed at 
distinguishing the specific characteristics of CBT from other therapies in order to 
determine the relationship of these techniques to outcomes. The authors suggest that 
recent research investigating the relationship between CBT interventions and patient 
outcomes have yielded discrepant results. They argue that some of the positive 
correlations between CBT techniques and patient improvement are not related to specific 
cognitive interventions. Rather several studies that they reference from the literature 
suggest that techniques employed from PI are increasingly used in CB therapies and 
account for some of the positive outcomes. These include a greater emphasis on the 
therapeutic relationship, exploration of defensive processes, an emphasis on patients’ 
affect, an acknowledgement of unconscious processes in human experience, and an 
increased focus on patient’s developmental experiences. Along with the increasing 
overlap in therapeutic techniques, the authors identified six characteristics that 
distinguished CBT from PI. These include an emphasis on homework, direction of 
session activity, teaching skills to cope with symptoms, focus on patient’s future 
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experiences, providing patient with information about treatment and his or her disorder, 
and a focus on the patients’ cognitive/intrapersonal experiences. It is important to note 
that in several studies reviewed, patient improvement was not strongly correlated to 
changes to maladaptive cognitions, which traditionally has been considered one of 
theoretical cornerstones of CB therapies.  
 Langmore and Worrell (2007) continue to build upon this analysis and examine 
critically the empirical anomalies in the literature. They identify three anomalies in the 
literature. First, there is little evidence that changing cognition improves outcome. 
Second, CBT is often associated with rapid and early improvement in symptoms that 
most often likely occur before the implementation of any specific cognitive techniques. 
(It is useful to note here that, in their study of STPP treatment for anxiety, Slavin, 
Mulford et al. (2011) found similar reports of rapid patient satisfaction and a feeling of 
confidence in their ability to improve their symptoms at the third or fourth session.) 
Third, cognitive mediators do not seem to precede changes in symptoms. In framing their 
analysis of these anomalies, the author’s posit that researchers are increasingly:  
proposing that multi-level cognitive architectures provide a more accurate  
description of human cognition. For example, Brewin, in his recent M.B. 
Shapiro Award Lecture (Lawson 2005) questions the proposition that 
challenging thought leads to changes in feelings and behaviors. Drawing 
on the finding of cognitive science, he proposes that human cognition 
comprises multiple memory systems and knowledge stores, not all of 
which are open to introspection. Further, he suggests that these multiple 
systems give rise to multiple self-representations. He concludes that 
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therapy is better employed as a constructivist strengthening of more 
helpful representations rather than a logico-deductive challenging of 
unhelpful representations. . . .Likewise for Teasdale (1997) . . . .therapy 
should focus on the clients “actual way of being” (p.150) rather than 
logically challenging beliefs (p. 174). 
 A summary of component analysis of the literature led Longmore and Worrell 
(2007) to conclude that cognitive interventions provide little or no added value to 
behavioral interventions. While the authors reassert the effectiveness of CBT, they also 
emphasize CBT’s status as an empirically grounded therapy, and call for further research 
on what specific techniques are most effective in the treatment of disorders if changing 
cognitions themselves is not the basis for improvement.  
While this analysis of the literature argues that there is no clear indication that 
treatment outcomes for CBT are any better or more evidence-based than psychodynamic 
ones, the terms “evidence based” and “CBT” have over time become almost 
synonymous. One primary reason for this is that CBT, at least in theory if not practice, 
can be manualized in a way that many psychodynamic therapies cannot.  
In a recent article titled “Where is the evidence for evidence based treatment?”, 
Jonathan Shedler (2013) critiques a review of a CBT study in which the reviewers 
uncritically state that outcomes in the study would improve if the clinicians who practice 
CBT strictly adhered to the protocols laid out in manuals, when in fact no data was 
collected offering evidence to support this claim. Shedler points to the unexamined set of 
unsupported assumptions about effective treatment practices that underlies this analysis. 
Shedler further argues that experienced clinicians change and modulate their approach 
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based on their experience of what helps patients. He also asserts that most clinicians who 
practice CBT rely on psychodynamic practices as well. A survey of CBT clinicians 
shows that the vast majority of them choose to see psychodynamically-oriented therapists 
for their own therapy and the influence of their own therapy on their work cannot be 
underestimated (Wachtel, 2011). Thus, the conflation of CBT with evidence based 
practice and the growing exclusion of psychodynamic approaches within the medical 
model of treatment relies on arguments that are often not supported by any evidence. 
Rationale and Clinical/Policy Implications of Project 
While the preceding literature review serves the useful function of examining 
some of the “evidence,” my purpose here is not to argue against CBT, or to claim that 
psychodynamic therapy is more effective, but to propose that an exploration and 
reevaluation of a core concept such as anxiety and its place in treatment can destabilize 
the dominance of the current medical model in which patients are too often 
problematized and reduced to their symptoms. My own focus on empirical evidence in 
this phenomenon chapter in order to assert the validity of psychodynamic treatments, 
clearly obviates my biases and how they inform this study. This focus also reproduces 
some of the closed logic that underpins the current loss of a more holistic, spiritual and 
socially conscious approach to mental health that is also part of the medical model. 
However, in subsequent chapters I hope to expand this framework; I will explore the 
concept of anxiety historically and conceptually within classical theory, interpersonal 
psychology, object relations, attachment, relational, and trauma theory, in order to shed 
light on the etiology, functions, and clinical utility of anxiety not only as a symptom or 
diagnosis but as in as an integral part of development and treatment. My hope is that a 
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multifaceted approach to understanding anxiety can destabilize and expand the narrow 
rationales and logic behind current treatment trends.  
My other hope is that this project will help erode some false divides between 
treatment practices so that each can borrow from the other without unnecessary 
judgments. Furthermore, many insurance companies only offer limited coverage when it 
comes to mental health. Since social workers often work within agencies and large 
systems where a combination of time pressure, financial concerns, and 
patient/community socio-economic status dictate forms of available treatment, valuable 
psychodynamic theories and practices that cannot be manualized or that may require 
more sessions, may increasingly get lost. Nowhere is this more evident than in the current 
medical focus on anxiety as a symptom and a disorder divorced from its other complex 
functions and meanings for the individual within his or her internal and external social 
context. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
Psychoanalytic Theorizations of Anxiety: Classical Perspectives, 
Object Relations and Attachment Theories 
 
 
 
In the case of external danger the organism has recourse to attempts at 
flight. . . . Repression is an equivalent of this attempt at flight. . . . . The 
problem of how anxiety arises in connection with repression is no simple 
one; but we may legitimately hold firmly to the idea that the ego is the seat 
of anxiety and give up our earlier view that the cathectic energy of the 
repressed impulse is automatically turned into anxiety (Freud, 1926, p. 
92).  
 
 
No concept is more central to psycho-analytical theory than the concept of 
anxiety. Yet it is one about which there is little consensus . . . . All 
analysts are agreed that anxiety cannot be explained simply by reference 
to external threat: in some way processes usually thought of as internal 
and instinctive seem to play a crucial role. But how these forces are 
conceptualized and how they give rise to anxiety, that has always been a 
puzzle (Bowlby, 1960, p. 91). 
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As the opening quotes suggest, psychoanalysts have grappled with the question of 
anxiety from Freud’s earliest formulations in classical theory to early attachment theorists 
such as John Bowlby writing in the 1960’s. This chapter attempts to trace the arc of some 
of these ideas as they evolved over the first half of the twentieth century. The chapter will 
examine chronologically the ways that these ideas were absorbed, expanded upon, and 
challenged by other major theorists as psychoanalysis sought to come to an increasingly 
accurate, nuanced, and clinically useful theorization of anxiety. A discussion of anxiety 
in the work of Sigmund Freud and Anna Freud lays the foundation for an exploration of 
Melanie Klein’s work and the role of anxiety in object relations theory.  Both classical 
theory and object relations theory contained the seeds of attachment theory, ideas that 
found fuller expression in the work of the attachment theorists such as Bowlby self-
psychologists like Winnicott. My hope is to capture a few of the central formulations of 
anxiety put forth by each of these influential theorists. I will explore the connection 
between their ideas in order to gain greater insight into anxiety as a phenomenon, the 
ways it has evolved in psychoanalytic theory, and the ways that these foundational 
theories inform more contemporary theorizations of anxiety, including interpersonal 
theory, relational theory, and trauma theory, which will be discussed in the next chapter.  
As the opening quote indicates, late in his career Freud changed his conception of 
anxiety. At first he viewed it as a kind of discharge phenomena, arising from the pressure 
of repressed libido (Wachtel 2011). In the opening passage from Freud’s later work 
“Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety,” he abandons this earlier economic understanding, 
and in his new formulation, anxiety is a signal mediated or called forth by the ego that 
leads to repression, the primary defense for Freud.  He goes on to argue that anxiety 
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begins during the trauma of birth, and this experience continues in new forms after the 
baby enters the world: 
When the infant has found out by experience that an external, perceptible 
object can put an end to the dangerous situation which is reminiscent of 
birth, the content of the danger it fears is displaced from the economic 
situation on to the condition which determined the situation, viz. the loss 
of object. It is the absence of the mother that is now the danger; and as 
soon as the danger arises the infant gives the signal of anxiety before the 
dreaded economic situation has set in. This change constitutes the first 
great step forward in the provision made by the infant for its self-
preservation, and at the same time represents a transition from the 
automatic and involuntary fresh appearance of anxiety to the intentional 
reproduction of anxiety as a signal of danger (1926, p.137). 
In this groundbreaking passage, Freud distinguishes between two main types of anxiety: 
automatic anxiety and signal anxiety. Automatic anxiety, such as the distress an infant 
feels upon birth, when he is hungry, or hears a loud noise, is the earliest, most primitive 
form of inescapable or “fresh” anxiety experienced almost at an organic level. For this 
reason, it is sometimes called annihilation anxiety since this phrase captures the degree to 
which it can overwhelm and terrify (Schamess and Shilkret, 2011). Through the 
relationship with the mother or caregiver, the infant learns that his/her anxiety can end 
through an external object.  The danger signal that is automatic or hardwired into the 
baby at birth is “displaced” onto the object or caregiver. Thus, automatic anxiety 
becomes a signal essential for survival in relationship with the object and the loss of the 
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object. Here Freud lays the foundation for object relations and attachment theorists such 
as Klein, Winnicott, and Bowlby who would further his ideas in subsequent decades.  
He also posits another striking idea that informed Klein’s work and continues to 
inform contemporary interpersonal, trauma, and relational theory -- namely that affective 
states (Freud points out that we are unable to define them) are there from the beginning of 
life; anxiety occupies no greater or lesser significance than others, but rather serves a 
specific survival function that adapts to each successive stage of development. In this 
regard, all development whether it be understood as “normative” or “pathological” is 
composed of the same affective materials including anxiety. While this insight may seem 
self-evident, it underscores the experience near phenomenon of psychoanalysis itself, 
whereby a therapist can empathically enter into another person’s affective experience and 
have an understanding of it, almost as if it were his or her own.  
If anxiety is universal and is understood as an affective signal of danger 
originating in the ego as part of its protective and synthetic functions, how then does 
Freud understand the difference between an external threat, the danger posed by the loss 
of the object, and the internal danger posed by an instinctual impulse? Freud writes:  
Anxiety is a reaction to a situation of danger. It is obviated by the ego’s 
doing something to avoid that situation or to withdraw from it. It might be 
said that symptoms are created so as to avoid the generating of anxiety. 
But this does not go deep enough. It would be truer to say that symptoms 
are created so as to avoid a danger situation whose presence has been 
signaled by the generation of anxiety (1926, p.128).  
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In order to illustrate the connection between the ego, anxiety, and symptoms, 
Freud uses animal phobias in children. He understood animal phobias to be an expression 
of castration anxiety whereby fear of castration and of punishment by the super-ego 
becomes depersonalized or conflated with fear of something in the external world – the 
fear of an animal. The benefit of this symptomology is that an animal can be avoided 
whereas a father cannot. 
While the centrality of castration anxiety in this formulation and in Freudian drive 
theory in general has, for most theorists, long since lost its explanatory power, Freud’s 
observation in the above passage remains a fascinating one: namely that symptoms are an 
attempt by the ego to avoid a danger situation whether internal or external, and thereby 
are an attempt to reduce anxiety. Thus a phobia, social anxiety, generalized anxiety, or 
any other form of anxiety that we now diagnostically label in today’s medical model as a 
distinct disorder with related symptomology, is, when viewed through the lens of 
Freudian theory, simply a signal of internal or external danger. Understood this way, 
anxiety is never a symptom or diagnosis on it own.  
Indeed the focus on anxiety as a symptom and on its eradication through 
treatment ignores the underlying etiology of anxiety, and its generation and over-
generation by the ego. The original instinctual impulse is given truncated expression in 
the form of a symptom, the ego’s attempt to reduce anxiety. Furthermore, the ego, 
through its integrative synthetic function, tries to “prevent symptoms from remaining 
isolated and alien by using every possible method to bind them to itself in one way or 
another” (Freud, 1926, p. 98).  In this process the symptom occupies what Freud called 
“extra-territoriality.” It becomes hidden, invisible to the ego itself. The symptom only 
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becomes apparent if in some way repression has failed. The presence of anxiety in this 
case can be understood as a danger signal that must be sent over and over again to 
reactivate repression and or other defenses.  
Anxiety and the Defenses 
Anna Freud continued working within Freud’s drive theory and his structural 
model, but became increasingly interested in the ego itself as the primary mechanism by 
which each individual mediates between the demands of internal and external realities. 
Like her father, she understood symptoms as a kind of “compromise” made by the ego 
through various methods of defense against instinctual demands (A. Freud, 1946). 
However, along with repression, Anna Freud delineated a variety of other defenses by 
which the ego sought to mediate between the instincts (id), the super ego, and the moral 
and ethical imperatives of the external world. This expanded exploration and focus on 
mechanisms of defense raises the question of how anxiety relates to the ego and its 
various defensive processes other than repression. Anna Freud argued that the ego itself 
had no quarrel with any of the instincts, and only utilized defense processes under 
pressure from the super-ego, the “mischief-maker” (A. Freud 1946, p. 59). The ego is 
motivated by what she called “super-ego anxiety” (A. Freud, 1946, p. 59). Yet Anna 
Freud also argued that while children defend against their impulses, this is not motivated 
by super-ego anxiety but by the threat of punishment or prohibition from adults in the 
outside world. She called this fear produced by external forces, “object anxiety” (A. 
Freud, 1946, p. 61). 
In her estimation, the origin of anxiety whether it be super–ego anxiety or object 
anxiety made no difference at all to the ego. She writes, “the crucial point is that, whether 
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it be dread of the outside world or dread of the super-ego it is the anxiety which sets the 
defensive processes going. The symptoms which enter consciousness as a result of this 
process do not enable us to determine which type of anxiety in the ego has produced 
them” (1946, p. 61).  In essence, this is a similar argument to that of her father who 
conflated castration anxiety with real dangers in the outside world.  
According to both father and daughter, the ego and the id are still not 
differentiated in children, and it is only as people get older and the “the pleasure 
principal” is replaced by the “reality principal” (A. Freud, 1946, p.63) that the ego begins 
to mistrust the instincts.  This transition in development is the root of anxiety in neurotic 
symptomology. Anna Freud writes that if  “the ego feels abandoned by these protective 
higher powers [the super-ego and the outside world] or if the demands of the instinctual 
impulses become excessive, its [the ego’s] hostility to instinct is intensified to the point 
of anxiety ” (1946, p. 63). Whether anxiety is instinctual, super-ego, objective, or an 
affect related to instinct, the result is the same activation of defenses. In practice, the 
analyst can only determine the source of anxiety by the strength of a patient’s resistance 
when the analyst begins to dismantle the patient’s defenses. For example, a patient who 
has super-ego anxiety will experience a sense of guilt around his instincts whereas a 
patient who has object anxiety may experience threat from the outside world.  
Anxiety is a signal that activates the ego’s defenses; however, repression is only 
one defense among the others with no primary place among the ego’s functions. As a 
result of Anna Freud’s work, projection, undoing, identification, reaction formation, 
denial, and other defenses became an integral part of ego psychology and the popular 
lexicon that carries over to the present day. Regardless of which defense is activated, 
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anxiety in ego psychology is not in itself a symptom, nor does the origin of anxiety 
necessarily predict which defense is activated by the ego since the same defense could be 
used in response to either an external danger or a threatening impulse. The primary area 
of focus for ego psychologists was identifying neurotic defenses and the unconscious 
instinctual impulses that had been converted by the ego into symptoms.  
Melanie Klein and Object Relations Theory 
The mid-century split between ego psychologists modeled after Anna Freud and 
Kleinians, led to the creation of distinct psychoanalytic societies, suggesting an 
unbridgeable rift. Yet, many of Klein’s fundamental ideas are a grounded in Freudian 
drive theory and ego defenses. However, unlike Anna Freud, who did not link particular 
types of anxiety with the activation of particular defenses, Klein focused on the ways that 
drives activate certain defenses that operate as an integral part of early development. 
Thus, it is easy to see how the two theoretical approaches seemed incompatible, or even 
diametrically opposed, even though they are both firmly grounded in Freudian drive 
theory.  
Klein accepts Freud’s theorization of the libidinal and aggressive drives that 
corresponds to the life and death instincts. However, for Klein, anxiety was not just 
automatic or a signal generated by the ego for survival; rather anxiety in the form of the 
“death instinct” and “annihilation anxiety” are present from the beginning of life and 
remain the core affective experience undergirding the rest of human development. She 
writes in the opening sentences of her later work: 
I have for many years held the view that the working of the death instinct 
within gives rise to the fear of annihilation and that this is the primary 
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cause for persecutory anxiety. It would appear that the pain and discomfort 
he [the infant] has suffered, as well as the loss of the intra-uterine state, are 
felt by him as an attack by hostile forces, i.e. as persecution. Persecution 
anxiety, therefore, enters from the beginning into his relation to objects in 
so far as he is exposed to privations (Klein, 1952, p. 61). 
 
Here, anxiety is no longer a signal of danger, but exists in relation to objects and is rooted 
in the experience of persecution in the form a hostile attack. The infant lives in a 
phantasmagoric world where he or she can be annihilated at any moment. This increase 
in persecutory anxiety heightens his or her own aggressive and destructive impulses. As 
Ruth Stein (1990) argues in her analysis of Klein’s work in the 30’s, sadism takes the 
form of fear of attack, which increases the child’s sadistic impulses. However, these 
impulses are not channeled into psychosexual stages as they are for Freud, but become 
attached to objects in the child’s life that are both continually introjected (internalized) 
and projected onto (expelled or externalized), setting in motion a circular pattern within 
relationships. It could be argued that these defensive operations and the degree to with 
they protect the infant’s fragile ego from their own aggressive impulses lays the 
foundation for dangerous relational cycles that continue into adulthood, a formulation 
that bears a close resonance with Freud’s concept of the repetition compulsion in 
relationships. For Klein, object relations in infancy are directly connected to the same 
affects and defensive processes in all people, and these underlie, moreso than the 
psychosexual stages, the affects and ambivalence that structure the individual psyche in 
relationship to others. The circular nature with which aggression generates anxiety and 
anxiety generates aggression, internal impulses and external objects are projected and 
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then introjected, then expelled again through projective identification, is emblematic of 
the fluid and circular logic which structures Klein’s theory of how humans develop in 
relationship; opposites continually exists alongside each other either isolated or split off 
from each other or integrated by the ego to a greater or lesser extent. 
This fundamental ambivalence between opposites extends in Klein’s work to the 
life long struggle between antithetical affects. She writes: “The recurrent experiences of 
gratification and frustration are powerful stimuli for libidinal and destructive impulses, 
for love and hatred. As a result, the breast inasmuch as it is gratifying is loved and felt to 
be ‘good’; in so far as it is a source of frustration, hated and felt to be ‘bad’ (Klein, 1952, 
p. 62). 
The infant’s ego is not developed enough to withstand annihilation anxiety, or to 
realize that gratification and frustration, good and bad, love and hate exist in the same 
object (the breast). Therefore, profound persecutory anxiety leads the infant to isolate 
these affects through splitting in the earliest stages of development. In other words, the 
bad breast and good breast cannot be allowed to exist in the same object or caregiver, just 
as those same affects cannot exist simultaneously in the infant; the infant cannot destroy 
the very object that gives it life and sustenance or believe that that same object is out to 
destroy him or her if he or she is to accept, devour, and introject the good object. All of 
this also requires the defenses of denial and idealization in order to keep the good object 
completely separate from the existence of the bad. For Klein, the defense mechanisms of 
isolation, splitting, denial, and idealization are a fundamental and unchanging process in 
the earliest stage of infant development. She labeled this process the paranoid-schizoid 
position.  
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The infant’s experience of privation and gratification are indistinguishable from 
their own fantasies and omnipotence and are constantly projected and introjected in self-
reinforcing patterns. The universal nature of this affective process rooted in the death 
instinct and persecution anxiety form the basis for both “normative” and “pathological” 
development; the seed of both are present and possible in all people. Again this highlights 
the experience near process of psychoanalysis: the ability of one person to empathize 
with and enter the cognitive and affective experience of another even if the other is 
understood as suffering from a “disorder” such as psychosis. 
While Klein (1952) writes of the good breast and bad breast to capture the infant’s 
dependency and the unintegrated schizoid nature of this stage, the relationship the infant 
has to the mother’s breast extends to the mother’s bodily presence in all it forms. It could 
be stated that the mother’s whole body is gradually introjected as an object, which also 
implies the burgeoning possibility of greater psychic integration. Indeed for Klein, this is 
what emerges out of early infancy as the good and bad objects gradually become attached 
to the same caregiver.  
The infant is in a constant process of establishing their object relationships. As the 
infant attaches libidinal love-feelings to the object, projects this outward, and then 
reintrojects these feelings in relationship to the caregiver, persecutory anxiety produced 
by external hardship and aggressive impulses is counterbalanced by loving or good object 
relations. Klein writes:  
. . . the relation to both the internal and external world improves 
simultaneously and the ego gains in strength and integration. Progress in 
integration . . . depends on love-impulses predominating over destructive 
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impulses, and leads to transitory states in which the ego synthesizes 
feelings of love and destructive impulses towards one object (first the 
mother’s breast) (1952, p. 65). 
This early attempt by the ego at synthesis leads to what Klein calls the depressive 
position, in which primitive defenses such as isolation, splitting, and denial give way to 
greater synthesis and integration. Inherent in this process are the generation of 
qualitatively different affective states. Klein writes: 
All these processes of integration and synthesis cause the conflict between 
love and hatred to come out in full force. The ensuing depressive anxiety 
and feeling of guilt alter not only in quantity but in quality. Ambivalence 
is now experienced predominantly toward a complete object. Love and 
hatred have come much closer together and the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ breast, 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ mother cannot be kept as widely separated as in the 
earlier stage (1952, p. 72). 
 
The infant’s destructive impulses are now experienced as a threat to the good object, and 
Klein describes a complex process of guilt, inhibition of destructive impulses, and a kind 
of mourning for the loss of the all good object that is inherent to the growing awareness 
of what Klein calls “increasingly poignant psychic reality” (1952, p. 73). For Klein, 
development and human relationships in general are shaped by the ambivalent affective 
states that characterize the depressive position. She writes, “The anxiety relating to the 
internalized mother who is felt to be injured, suffering, in danger of being annihilated, or 
already annihilated and lost forever, leads to stronger identification with the injured 
object” (1952, p. 73). Now the ego’s primary job is to reduce the depressive anxiety 
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generated by the integration of ambivalent affects. Over time, the infant’s conception of 
his or her parents comes closer to reality. The capacity to manage depressive anxiety is 
directly related to the degree to which he or she was able to take in good objects in the 
earlier phase. 
In order to capture infant development, a phase of life that is ultimately 
inaccessible to language, and is therefore on some level unknowable, Klein relies on 
abstract language and theories to enter the realm of fantasy in ways that seem to resonate 
with observed and lived experience. Her insistence on an infant full of destructive affects 
who is fundamentally born into a psychotic state that is the foundation of development 
can seem like a dark and somewhat fantastic conjecture depending on the reader. Yet 
what Klein is really arguing in very sophisticated terms is what Ruth Stein calls (1990) a 
theory of affect, a way to explain the complex mental processes that characterize both 
‘normative’ and ‘pathological’ development. As Mitchell and Greenberg (1983) argue, 
the drives for Klein are really affects that develop and exist in relationship. Put simply, 
the caregiving environment either successfully reduces anxiety in its various forms or 
increases it through a dialectical process of expulsion, absorption, and reabsorption of 
external and internal objects, and this dynamic profoundly influences the developing ego. 
Along with her focus on affect and the drives, Klein’s developing infant is also clearly 
shaped by the quality of the relationship with the mother. In this regard, her work 
contains many of the seeds of attachment theory.  
Winnicott, Bowlby and Attachment Theory 
Although Klein argued that persecution anxiety could be reduced through the 
loving objects, infancy for Klein was fundamentally fraught with profound anxieties and 
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ambivalence.  By contrast, for Winnicott, the mother-child relationship was central to all 
aspects of development and the quality of this relationship and not the drives, played the 
most formative role in shaping development. He captured the nature of the mother-child 
relationship with the concept of the “holding environment.” Flanagan aptly describes the 
holding environment as “the capacity of the mother to create the world in such a way for 
the baby that she feels held, safe, and protected from the dangers without and protected as 
well from the dangers of emotions within” (2011, p. 127).  
Winnicott distilled some of the complex object relations in Klein’s 
phantasmagoric theorization into a more streamlined and accessible concept that is now 
common in psychoanalytic theory as well as many parenting books. While parents may 
not take reassurance in understanding their newborn as psychotic and fearing 
annihilation, they can certainly embrace creating a loving safe environment in which the 
child is protected from internal and external dangers and anxieties. No doubt this helps 
explain why the holding environment has become a familiar concept and the paranoid-
schizoid position, regardless of its explanatory resonance, is not. 
While Klein and Winnicott understood anxiety in some similar ways, they 
conceptualized it using very different language. Just as Klein postulated that early object 
relationships create the intrapsychic and relational processes that inform later pathologies 
and relational dangers, Winnicott argued that “insanity” was grounded in what were 
universal phenomena (1963); every person had the empathic capacity to understand the 
“insane.” In his paper “Fear of Breakdown,” Winnicott (1963) replaces the concept of 
annihilation anxiety with a common phenomenon he observes in many psychotic patients 
– what he calls the “fear of breakdown.” By breakdown, Winnicott means a failure of a 
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defense to protect ego organization rooted in early development when the infant is 
entirely dependent on and undifferentiated from the mother.  In Kleinian terms, this 
might be understood as a failure of defensive processes to reduce annihilation and 
persecution anxiety. Rather than using the concept of anxiety to explain early 
development, Winnicott states that anxiety is not a strong enough word to describe what 
he calls “primitive agonies” (1963, p. 89). Indeed for Winnicott (1963), anxiety did not 
capture the agonizing fear that lead to early ego defenses, and psychotic illness was itself 
a kind of defense against these.  
Thus, the fear of breakdown that he observed in many of his patients was not the 
fear of something new, or something that was about to happen, but the fear of psychic 
deaths that had already occurred for the individual in early childhood as their ego 
organization was forming. Winnicott writes, “it is the fear of the original agony which 
caused the defence organization which the patient displays as an illness syndrome” 
(1963, p. 90). Thus, it could be said that the patient does not have annihilation anxiety; 
rather, the patient has already been annihilated, and what he or she fears are the psychic 
deaths he has previously experienced which remain hidden in his unconscious. Like the 
infant ego in Klein’s paranoid schizoid position, Winnicott argues that by unconscious he 
means that “ego integration is not able to encompass something. The ego is too immature 
to gather all the phenomenon into the area of personal omnipotence” (1963, p. 91). The 
early experience remains hidden or isolated and split, precisely because the ego does not 
have the capacity to integrate or encompass it. Therefore, the only way for the patient to 
end his fear of breakdown is to actually have a breakdown or to “gather it into its own 
present time experience and into omnipotent control (assuming the auxiliary ego-
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supporting function of the mother [analyst]” (Winnicott, 1963, p. 91). The ego can then 
begin to integrate what the immature ego was unable to handle. In contrast to Klein, 
Winnicott’s psychic deaths are not rooted in the drives, but are primarily created by 
“failures in the facilitating environment” (1963, p. 91) that impinge on the individual in 
ways that overwhelm his immature ego. Here Winnicott is implying the concepts that 
underlie attachment, for what he is really positing is a failure in the holding environment 
that disrupts attachment. 
For Bowlby, such a failure in the caretaking environment is generated by 
separation anxiety, the cornerstone of Bowlby’s theorization of anxiety and its role in 
normative and pathogenic development. Like the object relations theorists, Bowlby 
continued to view anxiety in a relational context. However, for Bowlby, anxiety was not 
just a failure of the holding environment; rather, he understood anxiety as an essential 
survival instinct shaping the infant-mother relationship. In other words, separation 
anxiety is central to survival since it impels the infant to seek its mother for survival at 
the same time that it gives rise to the instinct to flee from a perceived threat. Thus, 
anxiety has a highly adaptive function within Bowlby’s attachment framework. 
In his article “Separation Anxiety,” Bowlby (1960) grounded his theoretical 
framework in his observations of children ages 15 to 30 months old who were admitted to 
the hospital, separated from their mothers, and cared for by a changing series of nurses. 
Over time, these children all displayed a similar set of responses, starting with protest 
(crying and upset), then grief and mourning (withdrawal) and finally detachment (a 
turning away from human relationships). The first phase in which the child cries for its 
mother demonstrates separation anxiety, the second, mourning, and the third, defense. 
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While Freud was aware of all of these processes, Bowlby argues that Freud discovered 
them in the reverse chronology to the way they actually occur (1960). This made it 
difficult for Freud to theorize their connection to each other until the end of his career 
when he began to put the pieces together in “Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety” (1926).  
According to Bowlby, in this late work, Freud finally realized the central etiological role 
of separation anxiety in development.  
In “Separation Anxiety” (1960), Bowlby summarizes six primary theories of 
anxiety including Freud’s and Klein’s and concludes that both of these theories revolve 
around attachment. However, Bowlby rejects Klein’s notions of depressive and 
persecutory anxiety as well as Freud’s notion of signal anxiety, and asserts that the idea 
of “primary anxiety” has the most explanatory power. As Bowlby’s observations of the 
infants in the hospital bore out, “the child is bound to his mother by a number of 
instinctual response systems, each of which is primary, and which together have high 
survival value” (Bowlby, 1960, p. 92). In other words, when the isolated child cries, this 
activates clinging and following in order to motivate closeness to the mother. “Pending 
this outcome, it is suggested, his subjective experience is that of primary anxiety; when 
he is close to her it is one of comfort” (Bowlby, 1960, p. 92). Thus, for Bowlby, primary 
anxiety and its attendant instinctual response system is a physiologically-based behavior 
pattern bred into the organism through evolution that allows for the attachment between 
mother and infant to occur.  
Bowlby (1960) further argues that once activated, if the instinctual response meets 
some kinds of blockage and cannot reach its termination point, then anxiety is generated. 
Thus, if the baby in the hospital cries for its mother, but she does not come, this generates 
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separation anxiety and the co-occurring psychological and physiological changes in the 
infant. If separation anxiety becomes too great and there is no termination point, this has 
a particularly “pathogenic” effect on the infant since he or she is entirely dependent at 
this phase life (Bowlby, 1960). Likewise separation engenders fear which is connected to 
the fight or flight response. Thus, separation anxiety is “doubly alarming” (Bowlby, 
1960, p. 104) for the infant, and this is another reason why he posits that “. . . separation 
anxiety is the inescapable corollary of attachment behavior” (1960, p. 102). If anxiety is 
inextricable from attachment -- the foundation of human relationships -- can anxiety ever 
be a symptom treated independently of other dynamic processes, and can it ever be 
eradicated? 
In classical theory, object relations, and attachment theory, anxiety is inextricably 
bound to human development and survival, and can never be treated as an independent 
phenomenon that exists outside of relationships. In recent years, multiple studies have 
established a strong correlation between the nature and quality of early and adult 
attachment relationships and the susceptibility to and prevalence of mental health 
disorders. Thus, as a disorder, anxiety can better be understood within a psychoanalytic 
frame as a disturbance in attachment. Viewed through the lens of theorists such as 
Bowlby and Winnicott, failures in the caretaking environment lead to psychological and 
physiological responses that inform relational patterns and intrapsychic processes that are 
now classified as disorders.  
The relational focus of attachment theory with its roots in classical theory and 
object relations laid the foundation for the interpersonal and relational theorists who 
extend these ideas into an increasingly nuanced and complex understanding of psychic 
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processes and how they develop both inside and outside the therapeutic relationship.  
Several of these theorists, including Harry Stack-Sullivan, Stephen Mitchell and Phil 
Bromberg, will be discussed in the next chapter. Ideas about the role of anxiety in the 
therapeutic relationship itself as well as notions of self and how that relates to attachment 
and anxiety will be further explored as well. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
The Emergence of Relational Theory and Anxiety in a Relational 
Context 
 
 
Introduction  
This chapter will continue to examine theoretical formulations of anxiety and the 
ways that they have been integrated through relational theory. Paralleling the mid-20th 
century development of British object relations and attachment theory, in the United 
States, Harry Stack Sullivan developed his theory of interpersonal psychiatry. This 
chapter will begin with an examination of some of Sullivan’s central ideas, particularly 
concerning the function of anxiety in relationships, a central facet of his theorization. The 
chapter will shift focus to contemporary relational theory as outlined by Stephen 
Mitchell, and will examine the ways that Mitchell integrates interpersonal theory, object 
relations, and attachment theories creating what is now thought of as relational theory. 
Finally the chapter will explore Phil Bromberg’s theorization of trauma and dissociated 
self-states in conjunction with some of the foundational ideas about trauma articulated by 
Judith Herman. Some connections between these theorists and earlier formulations of 
anxiety will be explored as well as the question of how anxiety itself becomes part of the 
process of therapeutic change within Bromberg’s relational theorization of disassociation 
and trauma. 
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Interpersonal Theory 
 
. . . .The need for interpersonal security might be said to be the need to be 
rid of anxiety. But anxiety is not manageable: It comes by induction from 
another person; the infants capacity for manipulating another person is 
confined at the very start, to the sole capacity to call out tenderness by 
manifesting needs; and the person who would respond to manifest need in 
the situation in which the infant is anxious is relatively incapable of that 
response because it is the parental anxiety which induces the infant’s 
anxiety – and . . . anxiety always interferes with any other tensions with 
which it coincides. Therefore, there is, from the very earliest evidence of 
the empathic linkage, this peculiar distinction that anxiety is not 
manageable (Sullivan, 1953, p.43). 
 
Harry Stack Sullivan, one of the originators of interpersonal psychology, posited 
anxiety as the central force mediating relationships. Unlike Freud and early object 
relations theorists such as Klein who understood forms of anxiety primarily as innate 
intra-psychic processes influenced by relationships with caregivers and the outside world, 
Sullivan understood anxiety entirely as a manifestation of interpersonal relationships. As 
Greenberg and Mitchell argue, Sullivan’s interpersonal focus marks a paradigm shift 
from a drive model and structural theory to a relational focus (1983, p.12). Unlike Freud 
who understood development and human motivation as a manifestation of the drives, for 
Sullivan human behavior is motivated by needs, satisfaction, and security within 
relationships. Sullivan writes,  
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whether one is getting more or less anxious is in a large sense the basic 
influence which determines interpersonal relations – that is, it is not the 
motor, it does not call interpersonal relations into being, but it more or less 
directs the course of their development (1953, p. 160).  
For Sullivan, structural models of the mind, whether they be through the lens of Freudian 
drive theory or object relations theory, were at best an imagined and static rendering of 
what he saw as a constantly evolving set of dynamic processes in which the individual 
psyche took shape and constantly adapted within an interpersonal field. 
Similarly to attachment theorists like Bowlby and self-psychologists like 
Winnicott, Sullivan focused on the role of caretakers and the caretaking environment. 
However, for Sullivan, anxiety only exists in the interpersonal field between individuals 
and is generated by the caretaker; anxiety did not serve an adaptive function, it was not a 
signal, a primal instinct or a fear of a previous psychic death; rather anxiety is an affect 
passed on to children by their caretakers that serves little function other than to interfere 
in the establishment of a pattern of mutually satisfying relationships. According to 
Sullivan, the infant’s earliest relation to caregivers is one of need that generates 
“tenderness” (Sullivan, 1953, p.40) in a caregiver (what he termed the mothering one) 
and the desire to fulfill these needs. Thus, relationships from the outset revolve around 
the mutual satisfaction of needs.  However, if the caretaker does not meet these needs, or 
the caretaker experiences anxiety with regard to these needs, this is passed from caretaker 
to infant through “empathic linkage” (Sullivan, 1953, p. 41) and a process of emotional 
contagion (Sullivan, 1953, p. 53): a dialectical model in which caregiver anxiety is 
transmitted to the infant, and the resulting anxiety in the infant further exacerbates 
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caregiver anxiety creating an affective state that is a closed system, with no escape, and 
as the opening quote states, no mechanism for management.  
The experience of anxiety in relationships over the course of development is 
central to the formation of what Sullivan termed the “self-system” (1953, p.109) in 
adults, shaped by each individual’s efforts to avoid or to reduce anxiety. Over time, 
children adapt their behavior in response to caregiver anxiety, avoiding the behaviors that 
exacerbate anxiety and engaging in the ones that reduce it.  This process shapes each 
person’s self- system, grounded within a set of internalized personifications that take 
shape in relationship to caregivers. Sullivan broke these personifications down to three 
categories: “Good me,” is the child’s experience of self when their needs are satisfied by 
caregiver tenderness and reward. “Bad me,” is the self personification based on 
experiences along an “anxiety gradient” in relationship with the “mothering one,” who 
reinforces behavior and self experience through forms of mutual acceptance and 
disapproval. “Not me” occurs through the experience of intense anxiety in relation to 
caregivers and is the basis in Sullivan’s theorization of serious mental disorders such as 
schizophrenia (Sullivan, 1953, p.162). Intense anxiety completely obscures the 
connection between affective experience and reality, and the person is left in a primitive 
state of dread in which affective states cannot be integrated with lived experience. 
These personifications based on early experiences with caregivers (not just the 
mother) form the self-system and give rise in adults to what Sullivan terms “security 
operations” (Sullivan, 1953, p.169).  Security operations are the complex processes and 
formulations of self that help each individual to minimize anxiety through an illusory 
sense of self that allows each person to feel powerful, safe and secure (Mitchell and 
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Black, 1995, p. 84). In this regard, security operations are based on a sense of self that 
operates outside of conscious awareness, which obscures the original early experiences in 
relationships that generated anxiety. Thus, security operations create distortions; past 
relational patterns contained in the self-system limit experience and shape current 
relationships in ways that prevent the mutual satisfaction of needs. The invisible or 
unconscious nature of these operations and how they confine and distort relational 
patterns is, for Sullivan, at the heart of the analyst’s work with every patient.  
Further breaking with Freudian theory and early objects relations theorists such as 
Klein, the analyst in Sullivan’s interpersonal theorization (1953, p. 13) is not a blank 
screen, an object, or a site of projective identification, but is part of the interpersonal field 
that shapes the self–system from moment to moment. The patient inevitably enacts 
security operations rooted in past relationships with the analyst, a conception similar in 
some ways to Freud’s idea of transference. However, for Sullivan the analyst was not a 
passive recipient of transference but what he called a “participant observer” in the 
relational field.   
The clinician’s careful attunement to what Sullivan termed the anxiety-empathy 
gradient in the relational field (1953, p.160) creates a secure enough environment for the 
patient to experience his or her vulnerabilities in relationships, and the ways that 
relational patterns designed to avoid or reduce anxiety in the short term, undermine a 
greater range of satisfying relational experiences and mutuality in the long run. It is the 
analyst’s job to identify the patient’s security operations and underlying self- system in 
order to understand the source of anxiety in relationships. The aim is to help the patient 
identify self-limiting behaviors and find new more satisfying ways of relating. Thus, 
	   42	  
while the analysts is a participant in the relational field, the analyst, as the word 
“observer” implies, always remains in some sense outside the enactment, clarifying the 
nature of the patient’s security operations from within their professional role. Mitchell 
and Black write:  
Sullivan did not regard it as helpful for the analyst to get deeply personally 
involved with the patient. The analyst was an expert at interpersonal 
relations, and her expert status would keep her from getting drawn into 
pathological integrations. . . . The competent analyst would have no strong 
or turbulent feelings for the patient (1995, p. 79).  
Within this framework, the analyst is a participant in the relational field, but only insofar 
as he or she is ultimately an expert guide helping the client through the maze of their self-
system and security operations. The analyst helps the patient find their way out of an 
invisible, closed, anxiety driven relational system into more open terrain where the 
patient can relate more freely within a broader, less anxious and more mutually satisfying 
interpersonal landscape.  
Relational Theory 
The paradigm shift that took place in the development of interpersonal theory, 
object relations, and attachment theories moving from the intra-psychic and a drive 
model, to an understanding of the mind as taking shape and only having meaning within a 
relational context, profoundly altered the theory and practice of psychoanalysis in recent 
decades. The increasing dyadic emphasis of British object relations theories developed by 
Klein, and Fairbairn signaled a shift away from classical theorizations that were almost 
exclusively grounded in drive-based intrapsychic processes. Likewise, the emergence of 
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attachment theories in England by theorists such as Bowlby, Ainsworth, and Winnicott 
marked a shift towards an increasingly dyadic view of development from infancy 
onwards. 
Paralleling these dyadic developments among English object relations theorists, 
Sullivan’s interpersonal ideas of self as a set of illusory dynamic constructions formed to 
manage anxiety in relationships (1953), also prefigured the postmodern paradigm shift to 
notions of a decentered reality in which all “truth” is conditional and constructed. 
Sullivan abhorred static psychiatric claims to authority and its obfuscating language of 
mental illness that shaped the treatment of schizophrenics that he witnessed early in his 
career. He was equally uncomfortable with the presumptions of structural theory and 
object relations as offering “imagined furnishings” of the unconscious (Mitchell and 
Greenberg, 1983, p. 104). According to Sullivan, all of these theories utilized language 
that suggested certainties where none existed. Despite his attempts to avoid the pitfalls of 
theorizing phenomenon that fundamentally defied language, Sullivan’s entire system of 
thought is based on a very concrete assumption or truth: namely that anxiety is the 
primary affect shaping human development and social interaction. In some respects, like 
Freud’s focus on repression or the super-ego within the drive model, the management of 
anxiety vis-a-vis the self system has an equally axiomatic and perhaps reductive place 
within Sullivan’s interpersonal formulation.   
The imperative to legitimate their ideas -- for Freud to make psychoanalysis 
scientific, and for Sullivan to do the same with interpersonal psychiatry -- is one way to 
understand the focused emphasis of both of these early theorizations. Viewed within the 
social, historical, and personal forces of the times in which they lived, both men 
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attempted to delineate clear schematic, scientific explanations of what are intangible and 
elusive phenomenon. Indeed in Sullivan’s 1948 paper titled “The Meaning of Anxiety in 
Psychiatry and Life,” he supplies drawings that render schematic representations of the 
personality and the ways that anxiety shapes the relational field. Sullivan writes, 
“scientific psychiatry has to be defined as the study of interpersonal relations” (1953, p. 
368), a statement that now appears to relational theorists as almost paradoxical in its 
aims. 
While the pressure for scientific and empirical evidence as the basis for theory 
and treatment practices is hardly a relic of the past (as the current dominance of the 
“evidence based” medical model makes clear), the relational turn of psychoanalytic 
theory in recent decades embraces an increasingly decentered understanding of human 
experience, attempting to integrate the claims and ideas of seemingly incompatible or 
closed theoretical systems. Stephen Mitchell, in his book Relational Concepts in 
Psychoanalysis An Integration (1988), explicitly makes this his primary project. Mitchell 
charts the paradigm shift from the one-person drive theory model to the increasingly two 
person models beginning with attachment theorists such as Bowlby and object relations 
theorists such as Fairbairn, and self-psychologists such as Winnicott. He integrates these 
ideas with Harry Stack Sullivan and subsequent interpersonal and relational theorists. 
Mitchell understands the monadic emphasis of drive theory as incompatible with 
relational views in which the mind is primarily viewed as “interactive” (1988, p. 60). For 
this reason, he does not attempt to integrate classical drive theory with relational theory, 
but sees it as a “derivative of the interactional field” (Mitchell, 1988, p.61). Mitchell 
writes:  
	   45	  
Freud’s system, like all intellectual constructs, has inevitably been 
outgrown, but the singularity of his achievement became the model 
followed by his successors, who tend to present their contributions not as 
partial replacements or solutions to particular features which Freud 
addressed, but as alternative, comprehensive systems. Consequently, they 
overlook the similarity and compatibility of their efforts and call for 
exclusive loyalty, which is neither compelling nor necessary (1988, p.7). 
This stated goal of integration frames Mitchell’s project, and throughout his book, he 
finds ways to connect interpersonal theory to various object relations theories, as well as 
pointing out the differences. Mitchell writes: 
I do not believe that interpersonal interactions are merely an “enactment” 
of a more psychologically fundamental world of internal object relations 
or “representations”; nor do I believe that subjective experience is merely 
a recording of actual interpersonal interactions. The most useful way to 
view psychological reality is as operating within a relational matrix which 
encompasses both intrapsychic and interpersonal realms (1988, p.9). 
 
Where then does his project of integration leave the concept of, and 
phenomenological experience of, anxiety within the relational matrix? Although Mitchell 
never states this outright, the decentered nature of relational theory makes the 
prioritization of one affective state, or even a focus on its definition and treatment 
irrelevant, since anxiety cannot be defined as a phenomenon outside the relational matrix. 
However, it is useful here to look at some of the ways that he integrates different 
theoretical approaches already discussed in this thesis in order to understand how these 
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formulations of anxiety inform relational theory. In this regard, it can also be argued that 
relational concepts are less a theory in their own right, and more an integration of 
previous ideas, an overarching approach to psychoanalytic theory and practice that 
encompasses to a greater extent, the full complexity of psychological experience. 
Mitchell begins his theoretical integration with a discussion of frameworks that he 
labels “relational by design” (1988, p. 21) including Bowlby’s attachment theory which 
posits the infant’s relationship with the mother as a survival mechanism that is 
genetically encoded. As noted in the previous chapter, separation anxiety was, in 
Bowlby’s model, the corollary of attachment behavior. In this respect, attachment is a 
primary instinct that does not rely on relatedness from the outset, and as such, is 
consistent with Freudian ideas of drive that are derivative of Darwinian theory. However, 
Bowlby’s attachment theory also gestures toward the dyadic nature of infant development 
that sees interaction as an end in its own right, not a means of “gratifying or channeling 
something else” (Mitchell, 1988, p. 24) as it is in drive theory.  
Mitchell (1988) further points out that current infancy research increasingly 
suggests that rather than being an instinct that predates perception, attachment is from the 
outset very much connected to the experience in relationship with a particular person, and 
that the infant perceives far more from very early on than was previously understood. Put 
simply, infants are complexly relational from the outset and not just governed by primary 
instincts. Bowlby’s emphasis on separation anxiety, the cornerstone of his attachment 
theory that distinguished him from Freud’s idea of the object, can now be understood 
within a relational context as the attachment to a particular person or people and all the 
complexity this entails. Within this framework, separation anxiety is only one 
	   47	  
phenomenological experience amidst the multiplicity of relational experiences that 
defines infants and primary caregivers.  
A similar analysis also clarifies Sullivan’s conception of anxiety in the 
interpersonal field. Sullivan’s focus on essential human needs, the satisfaction of these 
needs, and the ways this connects infants and caretakers, locates him, along with Bowlby, 
in Mitchell’s relational by design grouping. While Sullivan abandons Freud’s reliance on 
drives as a primary motivation in human psychology, he replaces this with the 
interpersonal experience of the anxiety gradient; the need to avoid or reduce anxiety in 
the relational field. Ideally, relationships that are solely mutually satisfying without the 
intrusion of anxiety are possible, but the empathic linkage complicates this ideal, and 
creates what Sullivan called “problems with living” (1953. P.4) Thus, even as Sullivan 
argues that people only develop in relation to others and that notions of the self are in fact 
systematized illusions based on past relational patterns, the experience of anxiety remains 
the dominant affect shaping relationships. Relational design for Sullivan implies an 
opposite design flaw in the form of anxiety. 
Mitchell labels his next grouping, “relational by intent” (1988, p. 26), and focuses 
his attention on Fairbairn’s explanation for individual attachment to bad objects as a way 
to explain what Freud called the repetition compulsion of destructive or masochistic 
relationships and behaviors. Fairbairn argued that humans hold onto bad objects as an 
attempt to remain connected to their caregivers in the only ways that were available to 
them as infants and children (Mitchell, 1988). Mitchell writes that:  
Fairbairn regards object seeking as innate, and his approach is closely 
related to Bowlby’s notion of attachment. Bowlby portrays attachment as 
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an automatic mechanism, the product of instinctive, reflexive behavioral 
subsystems. . . . Fairbairn adds a consideration of intention and emotional 
presence or absence and thereby highlights the longing, the hunger for 
contact and connection, that propels human relationships (1988, p. 28).  
 
Mitchell argues that this complements Sullivan’s idea of relational by design in which the 
child’s innate needs, and not so much his intent, draw him or her into relatedness with 
others. Similarly to Sullivan, Fairbairn’s notion of loss of connection to bad internal 
objects and the fear of being alone in the world can also be understood as a way that 
anxiety experienced in past relationships generates the repetition of destructive or 
pathological relational patterns in order to preserve existing patterns of connection with 
primary caregivers. 
Mitchell also understands Klein in a relational context that he includes as 
relational by intent. Although Klein firmly grounded infant development in the drives and 
annihilation anxiety, persecution anxiety, and the anxiety and guilt produced by the 
ambivalence of the depressive position, Mitchell (1988) argues that Klein’s theorization 
can be read outside the realm of fantasy and drive. He translates Klein’s idea of 
reparation and gratitude versus envious spoiling and manic triumph into a more relational 
context that is similar in thrust to Fairbairn. He writes:  
The urge for reparation can be understood as emerging not as a reaction to 
fantasized damage, but to the other’s real sufferings and characteristic 
pathology. . . . Envious spoiling can be understood not as an excess of 
constitutional aggression, but as an attempt to escape from the painful 
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position of loving and desiring a largely absent or damaged parent, or, 
particularly, an inconsistent parent (Mitchell, 1988, p. 29). 
 
Notwithstanding Klein’s fantasy framework of powerful affects attached to objects, 
Klein’s infant develops in relationship with real caregivers who either reduce anxiety and 
the aggressive drives through loving object experiences or who heighten the defenses and 
destructive affects that underlie both the paranoid schizoid position and the depressive 
position. The emphasis of Klein’s primitive anxieties and powerful affects are, from a 
relational perspective, shaped by distinct primary relationships.  
Mitchell’s last theoretical grouping within the relational matrix, he labels 
“relational by implication” (1988, p. 29). He includes Winnicott and Kohut in this 
category and argues that the development of a sense of self that is central to both these 
theorists occurs in relationship to others, particularly primary caregivers. Winnicott’s 
almost exclusive focus on the holding environment created by the mother is the necessity 
for the emergence of a “solid sense of self as the central achievement of normal early 
development . . . .The capacity to experience and hold onto a sense of one’s own being as 
real depends on the mother’s doing so first, mirroring back to the child who he is and 
what he is like” (Mitchell, 1988, p.31).  Although Mitchell does not address Winnicott’s 
fear of breakdown as a central experience in mental illness, past experience of psychic 
death in relationships that underlies this fear suggests a fear of fragmentation in which the 
infant’s or child’s sense of self is damaged through an inadequate or destructive 
caretaking environment.  
Sullivan’s self-system comprised of illusory personifications of self is strikingly 
similar to Winnicott’s notion of the false self that takes shape in negating and pathogenic 
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caretaking environments. It could also be argued that Winnicott’s fear of breakdown 
bears a strong theoretical resonance with the splitting that occurs in Klein’s paranoid 
schizoid position and the ways that pathogenic care heightens annihilation anxiety. 
Psychic deaths that occurred in infancy and early childhood are covered over by a false 
self, or (understood in the multiplicity of the relational context) false selves are a product 
of experiences of intense anxiety in relationships that Sullivan labels with the self- 
personification of “not me” (1953, p.161).   While these ways of connecting theoretical 
constructions of anxiety and its role in psychological development are mine not 
Mitchell’s, the integration of these conceptions of anxiety that are central to what are 
usually framed as complete theoretical systems that must stand alone, is only made 
possible by the decentered orientation of relational theory. 
Within the relational matrix, the phenomenon of anxiety and its various 
theoretical formulations are not necessarily incompatible. While there is no attempt in 
Mitchell’s book to define anxiety or to pin down its role in relationships and the 
functioning of the human mind, the word “anxiety” and its implied meanings grounded in 
previous theoretical formulations, remain an important conceptual and linguistic referent 
in Mitchell’s discussions. In his description of the way that each person is embedded in 
his or her relational matrix, Mitchell writes: 
The prolonged condition of childhood dependency makes the discovery 
and forging of reliable points of connection not just an emotional necessity 
but an apparent condition for physical survival. . . . One’s condition can 
never be taken for granted. One is always in some ultimate sense at the 
mercy of adults. The parents can never be purely facilitative, simply 
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allowing the child to find his or her own path. The anxieties inherent in 
childhood make it necessary for the child to employ the parents as specific 
points of reference, their idiosyncrasies becoming anchors for all 
subsequent joinings (1988, p. 276). 
A closer reading of the language and conceptual content in this passage illustrates the 
ways that relational theory integrates previous theories to create a new paradigm. Indeed 
what is most striking about this passage is the range of ideas that it draws upon. The 
reference to “physical survival” is suggestive of the Darwinian primary instincts that 
undergird Bowlby’s attachment framework. “The prolonged condition of childhood 
dependency” implies the fundamental needs that create mutuality between infants and 
caregivers in Sullivan’s interpersonal theory. The notion that parents can never be 
“purely facilitative” references Winnicott’s holding environment as the condition for the 
formation of a sense of self while “[t]he anxieties inherent in childhood,” undermine the 
notion that such a preformed environment can exist. Yet this phrase also reaches still 
farther back to Freud’s idea of signal anxiety and its ubiquitous role in development, and 
likewise resonates with the profound anxieties that structure Klein’s stages of childhood 
development. Finally the word “idiosyncratic” in the last sentence of the paragraph, 
locates individual human experience outside the reach of any theory, stressing instead the 
unique relational matrix that shapes every person. While theoretical orthodoxy and any 
notion of scientific accuracy are discarded by the end of the paragraph, what emerges is a 
much more complex vision of human experience and the ways that individual psychology 
emerges and finds expression in relationships. 
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At the end of his project of integration, the final chapter of Mitchell’s book 
focuses on the analytic process itself and how change is facilitated through the 
therapeutic action within the relational matrix between analyst and patient. Mitchell 
(1988) points out that every theoretical stance generates a different set of questions and 
narratives, which influence the nature of the analytic action. However, in a relational 
approach, the analyst is not positioned, as in classical theory, outside the relational 
matrix. Nor is he a participant observer acting as an expert guide through anxiety, or 
offering a needed corrective of what was missed or damaged in childhood, as is the case 
in interpersonal theory and self psychology. Instead the analyst works from: 
within the structures and strictures of the repetitive configurations of the 
analysand’s relational matrix. The struggle to find his way out, the 
collaborative effort of analyst and analysand to observe and understand 
these configurations and to discover other channels through which to 
engage each other, is the crucible of analytic change” (Mitchell, 1988, p. 
292).  
The nature of being “embedded” is for the analyst “ ‘relatively uncontrolled at the 
experiential level’ ” (1988, p. 293) and in this respect is not fundamentally theory driven. 
This is not a license for the analyst to do whatever they want in session, but it implies that 
the analysand’s experience in relationship with the analyst is itself the primary action for 
change; interpretation, affect, language, tone, and non verbal expression are all integral 
parts of this process.  
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The Relational Matrix, Dissociation, and Multiple Self-States  
The contemporary relational psychoanalytic theorist, Phil Bromberg, extended 
both Sullivan’s and Winnicott’s ideas to encompass a greater range of expression than 
good, bad, and not me or a false self. Bromberg locates the idea for multiple self-states in 
Winnicott’s introduction to classical psychoanalysis of the idea of the decentered self 
(1998). Expanding upon Sullivan’s early formulations of a decentered self (good, bad and 
not me), Bromberg writes that:   
unless the concept of self-dynamism is revived and synthesized with a 
developmental evolution of “personifications” which is broader in scope, 
it will be extremely difficult to develop interpersonal theory beyond the 
point of seeing the “self” simply as an “anxiety-gating” mechanism with 
only ambiguous theoretical linkage to how it undergoes representational 
change in psychoanalysis. (1998, p. 40) 
In this passage, Bromberg challenges Sullivan’s idea that personifications take shape 
solely in response to anxiety in relationship. Here Bromberg alludes to what in his later 
work he calls dissociated self-states. For Bromberg, self-representation cannot be reduced 
to a few categories such as good me, bad me or not me, nor could the self’s only function 
be the management of anxiety in past and current relationships including the analytic one. 
Instead Bromberg argues that each person is composed of multiple self-states. 
Dissociation serves an adaptive or healthy function enabling their coexistence, yet 
allowing one or the other to come to the fore in order to enhance the ego’s integrating 
function of the infinite variety of stimuli presented by daily existence. In this formulation, 
dissociation, much like Bowlby’s conception of attachment, is an adaptive function 
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necessary for survival; it only becomes a pathogenic process when self states are 
fragmented to the degree that one is completely unknowable or lacks any cohesion with 
the others undermining “an overarching cognitive and experiential state felt as ‘me’” 
(Bromberg, 1998, p. 273). 
The experience of a unitary coherent self is also a necessary “adaptive illusion” 
created by the ability to dissociate self-states (Bromberg, 1998, p.273). It is only when 
this “adaptive illusion of unity is traumatically threatened with unavoidable, precipitous 
disruption that it becomes, in itself a liability because it is in jeopardy of being 
overwhelmed by input it cannot process. . . .” (Bromberg, 1998, p.273). Thus, 
paradoxically for Bromberg, “when the illusion of unity is too dangerous to be 
maintained there is then a return to the simplicity of dissociation as a proactive, defensive 
response to the potential repetition of trauma (1998, p.273).”  
At the same time that Bromberg challenges the clinical utility of Sullivan’s idea 
of a self-system developed to manage anxiety, Bromberg embraces Sullivan’s view of the 
empathy anxiety gradient as an apt way to understand what other theorists call the 
analytic holding environment. The interpersonal field between analyst and patient offers a 
pre-syntactic opportunity to access experiences that are beyond rational thought. Thus, 
Bromberg asserts:  
it is not simply a matter of getting the patient to confront unconscious, 
repressed, dissociated or un-attended data. To do so may or may not create 
useful behavioral change, but it will not in itself lead to representational 
restructuralization. What keeps preconceptual . . . experience so rigidly 
unyielding is that the “me-you” representation is organized around 
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elements which are more powerful than the evidence of reason (1998, 
p.49). 
He extends Sullivan’s idea of the interpersonal field to include an analytic 
relationship that fosters access to pre-syntactic self-states that are beyond memory 
or reason. Another way to say this is that Bromberg is embracing the notion that 
the patient analyst relationship offers elements of a new more secure attachment 
that helps the patient affectively not just cognitively restructure self-experience. 
Yet this new attachment relationship must also make the patient uncomfortable 
enough, or generate enough anxiety that the patient’s defenses can be experienced 
and articulated at the same time that the patient takes in the moment by moment 
soothing presence of the analyst. In so doing, the door is opened for the patient to 
experience self-states dissociated through trauma without becoming so 
threatening to the illusion of a unitary self that the patient is unable to tolerate the 
process.  
The conception of psychoanalytic action in this passage resonates with Mitchell’s 
idea of embeddedness and the ways that all facets of the relationship with the analyst 
become the basis for change. Trauma, in the sense that Bromberg uses it, is any 
subjective experience that threatens a unitary sense of self, which then activates defensive 
dissociative processes.  This psychoanalytic theorization of trauma mirrors the DSM’s 
definition of PTSD symptomology as one most often characterized by dissociation. Jon 
Allen writes that “clients with a diagnosis of PTSD have a high likelihood of being 
diagnosed with a dissociative disorder and vice versa” (2001, p.168).  
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In Judith Herman’s seminal work on trauma, she writes that “The conflict 
between the will to deny psychological events and the will to proclaim them aloud is the 
central dialectic of psychological trauma. . . . . The psychological distress of traumatized 
people simultaneously calls attention to the existence of an unspeakable secret and 
deflects attention from it” (1992, p. 1).  Hermann further writes that these alterations in 
consciousness in traumatized people are what professionals call “dissociation.”  While 
Herman explores many different forms of trauma from sexual abuse to the atrocities of 
war, there exists in all of them the tension of the spoken and unspoken; put another way, 
what can be incorporated into the illusion of a unitary self, to borrow Bromberg’s idea, 
whether that be individual or the collective memory of a an entire group, or whether that 
history must be kept silent, split off through defensive processes of individual and or 
group dissociation. Of course individual history cannot be separated from History in the 
broader sense, and often the trauma and dissociation in one mirrors the needs and 
imperatives of the other.   
While trauma can be thought of as linked to an event or a series of events, trauma 
can also be understood as a subjective experience in which a similar event or series of 
events may affect different individuals in different ways. Thus, what may be experienced 
as a threat to a unitary self and dissociated or kept secret by one individual can be 
integrated by another. Here Winnicott’s notion of a “fear of breakdown” (1963) is useful. 
Impingements in the caregiving environment or what he might call psychic deaths that 
already have occurred are dissociated and avoided for fear of breakdown. The subjective 
experience of anxiety can be so great that it leads to fragmentation, or in Bromberg’s 
view, a unity of experience too traumatic to incorporate. 
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 In an attachment framework, instinctual anxiety always predates trauma, but 
perhaps it is the quality of the attachment itself that makes individuals more or less 
susceptible to later trauma. Numerous recent studies have documented the connection 
between attachment style and susceptibility to symptoms of trauma such as anxiety and 
depression. Thus, in a contemporary trauma framework, anxiety is a common symptom 
of trauma. However, as Freud and Bowlby argue, anxiety also serves numerous adaptive 
functions. Trauma can derail these functions leaving the traumatized individual in state of 
anxiety with no termination point.  
Psychoanalytic theorizations of anxiety and its functions from Freud to 
contemporary relational and trauma theory offer a multifaceted understanding of anxiety 
beyond the medical recognition of it as a symptom to be treated. Indeed anxiety within a 
psychoanalytic frame is not a disorder. It is indispensible to survival and an important 
component of treatment, without which growth and the restructuring of self-
representation could not be possible. Psychodynamic psychotherapy offers a unique 
relational space in which the client can ultimately experience multiple self-states and yet 
over time retain their sense of unity. This is made possible by the safety of the attachment 
relationship between clinician and client, in which the termination of anxiety can only be 
found in seeking out and strengthening that connection.  
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CHAPTER V 
Discussion 
 
In the following composite case discussion, I hope to illustrate the ways that a 
relational approach can offer a comprehensive and effective way to conceptualize and to 
treat a patient experiencing anxiety. I also will use several classical object relations and 
interpersonal theories previously discussed in order to further illustrate them and to 
explicate this case. I purposely chose a case that is not emblematic of any one “anxiety 
disorder” in order to offer a counterpoint to the medical model. Like all patients, D’s case 
is unique. But it is also representative of a large proportion of students I saw throughout 
the year at the college counseling center where I did my field work, students who 
presented with general anxiety, social anxiety, and panic attacks, often co-existing. In this 
respect, D’s case captures the ubiquitous experience of anxiety, particularly within the 
18-25 year old college population, the age group with the highest rate of onset of what 
are understood and treated within the medical model as isolated anxiety disorders. I also 
hope this case raises more questions about how anxiety manifests and functions intra-
psychically and interpersonally within a systemic context and how anxiety can be an 
integral part of the treatment process when using a relational approach. 
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Introduction 
D began individual therapy with me at the start of the academic year. From the 
outset, he had what I can only describe as an anxious presentation. He sat on the edge of 
his chair, and very rarely leaned back, his small athletic build taut with energy. While D 
was articulate, and I immediately liked him, he spoke rapidly, leaving few silences, as if 
words were a way of staying aloft, like a dragonfly who will crash if it stops flapping its 
wings. He spoke at length about what he did or thought, but very rarely about what he 
felt. D was born in the US to parents who emigrated from Morocco in order to attend 
college, and he spoke fluent Arabic. He had black hair, dark brown almond shaped eyes, 
and light tan skin. In the context in which we met, I would not have known his ethnicity 
by his appearance alone. 
D’s presenting concern was social anxiety that led to an experience of isolation at 
college. When he first came in for treatment, D was “hiding in his room” feeling as 
though he did not know what to say to other students, a seemingly paradoxical experience 
for someone who spoke so much in session. He also recently broke up with a girlfriend 
he met at college, which left him feeling further isolated and anxious. His girlfriend told 
him that interacting with him was like “talking with a stone” since he rarely expressed 
emotion. D also experienced anxiety around his schoolwork that led him to procrastinate 
and to underachieve in his own eyes. He had what he described as occasional anxiety 
attacks in class when his heart started racing and he sweat profusely.  
D’s family had moved a number of times during his childhood -- from the West 
Coast back to Morocco for two years when D was a toddler, and then returning to the US 
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where they moved several more times before finally settling in the Midwest. His family 
moved often enough that eventually he stopped trying to connect more intimately with 
peers. D described himself as “not letting himself get too attached” to any friends. 
Throughout his childhood, D did well in school, and spent much of his time alone on the 
computer, either playing games or experimenting with web design and programming. 
Though small in stature, D was good runner on his high school team.   
During D’s junior year of high school, his parents separated, and his father 
returned to Morocco, where he remained. This separation was very upsetting for D, and 
he continued to struggle from the fallout when we met. D described his parents as having 
an unhappy marriage in which they were in constant disagreement over where the family 
should reside. D’s mother found work as a librarian in the US, but his father never found 
meaningful work. D characterized his father as an unhappy man who only took on 
intermittent, part time menial jobs. The family moved as his mother pursued better 
paying librarian jobs to support them, a situation that further undermined what D 
described as his father’s understanding of himself as  “traditional Muslim man who is 
head of the family.” D’s father never settled into their life in the US and often spoke of 
his desire to return to Morocco to be with and care for his extended family in the town 
where he grew up. D’s mother, on the other hand, had no interest in returning and wanted 
to remain in the US so that her children could take advantage of the educational 
opportunities here. With this fundamental conflict structuring the marriage, D grew up 
feeling as though he did not want to “add any more worries” to an already stressful 
situation. He “kept his head down” and did his schoolwork. Further into our therapy, he 
spoke of the way that the stress and unhappiness between his parents, and the lack of 
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communication and emotional connection in the family, became so “familiar to him” that 
he is not sure what he felt as he was growing up. Indeed this was a common theme that 
surfaced throughout our work together: often D did not know what he felt outside of an 
experience of anxiety, and if he had some awareness of his affects, it was difficult for him 
to communicate them.  
A consideration of intra-psychic and interpersonal theories within a relational 
treatment 
While I agree with Mitchell’s assertion that the monadic and intra-psychic 
emphasis of Freudian theory makes it difficult if not impossible to integrate it with the 
dyadic focus of relational theory, aspects of Freud’s conception of anxiety as a signal 
offer a useful entry point for this case.  Through a Freudian lens, D’s anxiety can be 
understood as a signal for repression as a primary defense. However, D did not repress 
his drives or his id impulses. Rather repression acted as a defense against the experience 
and expression of affect within his formative relationships and within a broader social 
context.  
As our work together proceeded, D became increasingly able to articulate how 
difficult it was for him as a child growing up around the uncertainty and tension within 
his parent’s marriage. After a time, D admitted that he resented his father for his 
“unwillingness” to adapt to life in the US, and he felt sorry for his mother who was left 
largely responsible for the family’s emotional and financial well being. Furthermore, D 
described his father’s unhappiness and diminished self–esteem within their home as part 
of a broader discomfort within the cultural and social practices here in the US, many of 
which conflicted with what D described as his father’s “religious upbringing.” Already a 
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quiet man by temperament, his father became increasingly marginal over the years.  It 
might be said that his father’s experience in his family became a parallel process for his 
experience of displacement and marginalization on multiple levels within the US. His 
experience can also be understood as racial melancholia, a kind of extended mourning for 
all that was lost in the process of immigrating to a predominantly white western culture 
(Eng and Han, 2000). D said that this situation made his father very short tempered with 
D and his brother, two years his junior. D’s brother also struggled academically. This 
generated more pressure on D to reduce the level of stress in the family. On the rare 
occasion when D expressed any unhappiness to or with his parents, it only increased his 
father’s anger and the conflict between his parents. As he got older, communication with 
his mother often led to judgments and coercion by her if D held different points of view 
or expressed emotions that did not make sense to her. Understood within this very basic 
outline of D’s relational, cultural, and socio-economic matrix, the experience and 
expression of affect became unsafe, a source of anxiety, that further threatened the 
somewhat tenuous stability of his family’s life in the US. Thus, it can be argued that 
repression served an adaptive function in relationships, and D’s anxiety, from a Freudian 
perspective, constantly signaled the ego’s activation of this defense.  
While Sullivan (1953) eschewed Freud’s structural model of the mind, Freud’s 
(1926) later notion of the way anxiety functions resonates in many ways with Sullivan’s 
interpersonal perspective. Within an interpersonal framework, D’s self-security system 
developed in order to reduce his experience of anxiety in relationships. For D, “good me” 
might be the son who did his schoolwork and contained his emotions in order to embody 
his parent’s needs and expectations of him. While “bad me” might be the son who 
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complained or got angry or sad, the son who felt responsible for his parents’ conflicts as a 
couple and in some ways for their individual unhappiness. The daily anxiety that D 
experienced at college might then be understood as his self-security system whereby 
limiting his social interactions and an anxious focus on schoolwork repeated the same 
security operations for managing anxiety that he used while at home. These attempts to 
reduce anxiety functioned largely outside conscious awareness, leading him to feel 
isolated and anxious without any apparent explanation in the present. Indeed upon 
entering therapy, D stated that there was no good reason for him to feel so anxious in the 
present at college, and in this respect, his “security operations” created mild dissociative 
states, or what might also be called temporal dislocations within his self-experience. This 
apparent disjuncture is part of what led D to seek out therapy even as he avoided or 
“repressed” affective expression in his daily life. 
A Kleinian object relations frame regarding affective development raises the 
important question of what happens when powerful affects such as love and hate are not 
more fully experienced and expressed. D’s internalization of his own parents as both 
caring, “good objects” and as vulnerable or punishing people --“bad objects”-- who could 
not tolerate affect left him in a position of trying to adapt himself to repair them, or at the 
very least, trying to avoid pushing them further apart. For Klein (1952), love and hate are 
derivative of the libidinal and aggressive drives, and are therefore universal. However, 
while affects and certain relational processes of rupture and repair may appear 
“universal,” the meaning of love and hate and how they structure relationships is not. 
Like all affective phenomenon, the meaning and experience of love and hate is 
subjective, and how they are understood and expressed in relationships is culturally and 
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socioeconomically contingent. In this regard, D’s father’s return to Morocco to be with 
his extended family was, according to D, an expression of love and belonging within his 
father’s belief system, even as he left the nuclear family that Americans tend to prioritize. 
Yet D was also profoundly hurt and angered by his father’s unwillingness to adapt to 
American life for the sake of his nuclear family, a choice that D said he did not want to 
reproduce in his own life. It was not until the final weeks of our work together that D 
expressed a greater range of affect about his family and his father in particular.  
Within a Kleinian formulation, it can be argued that D engaged in forms of 
splitting characteristic of the paranoid schizoid phase in which powerful affects cannot be 
integrated or experienced in relationship to the same objects. While I am not suggesting 
that D’s has a ‘schizoid’ personality or emotional make-up primarily rooted in early 
traumas in the caretaking environment, Klein’s theorizations (1952) also argue that 
splitting and other schizoid defenses are an integral part of both ‘pathogenic’ and 
‘normative’ development, and these defenses continue to function in all people, to a 
greater or lesser extent over the life course. Viewed through this lens, D’s inability to 
express hate (or perhaps more accurately, anger) toward his father and in relation to his 
own experience of abandonment, can be viewed as a kind of splitting wherein his father, 
the loved object is protected from D’s anger and or “hate.” These split and disavowed 
affects are then projected onto his father and the rest of the world and then, according to 
Klein’s circular processes, introjected, thereby heightening D’s annihilation and 
persecution anxiety in relationships; a formulation that helps explain the degree of D’s 
social anxiety, and his recurring fear that other’s were angry with him or did not like him 
that arose throughout our work together.  
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Just as D split or disavowed hateful affects, he also disavowed powerful feelings 
of love and desire. While he experienced himself as having these feelings (for example in 
relation to his ex-girlfriend), others, including myself, often experienced him as flat or 
inexpressive. Rather than integrating and expressing these affects, D projected and 
introjected them creating the relational dynamics in which D tried to meet the needs and 
desires of others, whether that be his parents, his girlfriend or me, but did not fully 
experience and express his own desires and or loving feelings. Whenever D’s defensive 
processes for managing and splitting “loving” as well as “hateful” affects was threatened, 
the possibility of further integration itself became a source of anxiety. Thus, D “kept his 
head down,” and did not clearly express his needs or desires at home, just as later in 
therapy -- as the next section will clarify -- he was unable to fully express his needs and 
desires with me.  
On a number of occasions, D also worried that he would become like his father –- 
disconnected from others, angry and alone -- and in this regard splitting and projection 
also protected D’s ego in the inevitable process of identification that takes place between 
parents and children, and fathers and sons in particular; by protecting (his father) from his 
anger and or hate as well as love, D also split these affects from himself, protecting 
himself as a he grew into a man, from the “hated” father who is also part of him. The 
cyclical patterns of projection and introjection that structure relational patterns from the 
outset are part of the processes of identification, which continue to occur throughout all 
development. However, as with the use of Freud’s theorization of anxiety in a relational 
context, D’s affects are not derivative of libidinal or aggressive drives, but are only 
experienced within a relational matrix that is contextually shaped and bound.  D tried to 
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understand the cultural and familial expectations that helped shape his father’s idea of 
relationships and the affects that structured them, but D grew up within a different 
cultural context than his father, one that realigned his emotional and relational priorities 
in a way that complicated his identifications with his father. In this regard, the concepts 
of splitting and projection can only be understood as part of the complex ways that D 
straddled two worlds, growing up in a very different context from either his mother or 
father. 
While Klein and Sullivan offer useful lenses for understanding anxiety in this 
case, both theories clearly have their limitations. To speak of D as having a good or bad 
self or to speak of D’s intra-psychic experience in object relational terms, as being 
composed of good and bad objects is unnecessarily reductive. After all, what is a “good” 
or “bad” self or object, and what do these words even mean to the person in treatment. 
While Sullivan embraced the decentered idea that a unitary self was a necessary illusion, 
the very idea that this illusion can be broken down into categories of good and bad is also 
an illusion.  From a relational perspective, a closer approximation of the “truth” is to say 
that D learned and internalized a set of patterns within the particular relational matrix of 
his family and these in turn exist in a dialectic with his own intra-psychic processes. 
Mitchell writes that he uses the term:  
‘relational matrix’ in an effort to transcend the unfortunate tendency to 
dichotomize concepts like interpersonal relations and ‘object’ relations, or 
the interpersonal and intrapsychic, as if a focus on either side necessarily 
implies a denial or deemphasis of the other . . . .The most useful way to 
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view psychological reality is as operating within a relational matrix which 
encompasses both intrapsychic and interpersonal realms (1988, p.9). 
 
However, a focus on interpersonal relationships and intra-psychic processes that 
does not understand them within a broader socio-economic and cultural context is also 
limited and distorting. D’s family, like every family, was decidedly shaped by their social 
status within a given context. Their particular experiences of immigration and the 
economic, social, and cultural forces with which they contended as they sought to build 
their life in the US and how these forces interacted with the relational patterns and social 
contexts that predated their immigration – all of these forces create the decentered 
“truths” that various theories attempt to organize. While this last point may seem self-
evident, a relational focus as articulated by Mitchell can obscure that family only exists 
within an infinitely complex dialectic with other systems. In this regard, the various 
manifestations of D’s anxiety are inextricably interwoven with the larger socioeconomic 
and cultural systems of which he and his family are a part. While the idea of a nuclear 
family suggests a core around which everything else orbits, the relational matrix in the 
most complex sense is more like a set of crosshatched lines and shapes moving in all 
directions, both familiar and perplexing, a Jackson Pollack painting in which the analyst 
and analysand work together to discern patterns and meanings.  
These overarching theoretical considerations point to the question Bromberg 
(1998) raises in his critique of Sullivan’s personifications. No matter how we frame or 
populate a patient’s intra-psychic landscape through classical and object relations theory, 
and no matter the degree to which we try to maintain some objectivity as participant 
observers within an interpersonal approach, this central question remains: How does the 
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self or for the purposes of this discussion, D’s self-experience, particularly with anxiety, 
undergo representational change within treatment, and what creates the therapeutic 
action? The section that follows explores the ways that D and I grew together as our 
relationship itself increasingly became the vehicle for change. 
Like the discussion of every individual with whom we work, the frameworks I use 
so far in this discussion generate a particular set of meanings that inevitably prioritize 
and/or exclude other information and meanings. Likewise, the focus on anxiety as a 
phenomenon as well as the use of theories that are not fundamentally dyadic generate 
their own tone and emotional tenor in the writing itself. While I tried throughout the 
previous section of this discussion to retain the integrity of D’s presentation as 
understood through my own limited subjectivity, the largely monadic theoretical focus of 
the previous discussion creates a tone that is more “analytic” and removed than 
collaborative. Rather than edit this to produce writing that might be more reflective of my 
own relational and inter-subjective experience of treatment, I think it is equally important 
and instructive to try to capture the ways that different theoretical orientations not only 
shape the therapeutic relationship, but the writing about that relationship as well. A 
monadic approach and even Sullivan’s less removed but professionalized and “empirical” 
participant observer create what can only be called expert distance since the analyst must 
remain outside of their client’s experience to some degree in order to treat them. It is also 
possible that D’s lack of affective expression at various points in our work together, finds 
a parallel representational process in this writing. 
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The embedded analyst and attachment  
D and I met weekly throughout the fall semester. We often spoke of his 
relationship with his ex-girlfriend who also lived on campus. They had been a couple 
throughout freshman and sophomore years. This relationship was the most intimate 
connection D ever made. Yet in the final months of the relationship, they often fought 
about D’s lack of emotional expression. She began to feel that he did not really love her, 
even though from his perspective, he felt as though he gave her a lot. D bought a car with 
money he made over the summer, and he drove his girlfriend everywhere. They ate all of 
their meals together, and if she needed any help when she was overwhelmed with 
schoolwork, D was always ready to lend a hand doing whatever was needed whether it 
was laundry or shopping. She accepted this help and care, and yet she said she did not 
feel loved. D began to resent her for all that he gave her and her lack of appreciation, 
while she felt increasingly disconnected from him. 
As we explored what happened in this relationship, D and I discovered that there 
were many things he felt in relation to his girlfriend, but he was so anxious about 
expressing himself that he either lost track of his emotions in her presence or became 
paralyzed, unable to express them. Despite his trouble communicating, he did not 
understand how the things he did for her did not adequately express his commitment and 
love. As we continued to meet over the fall semester, D began to regret that he did not 
express himself more fully with her. He still ran into her on campus and they spoke, but 
he remained too anxious to disclose more to her.  In the context of this relationship, we 
began to talk about the ways that love in his family was expressed through sacrifice and 
fulfilling obligations, as his mother had sacrificed for him and his brother, and his father 
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sacrificed for his extended family. In his effort to avoid becoming like his father and 
mother, D assiduously attended to his girlfriends needs to demonstrate his commitment to 
“making things work.” Often as D spoke of his girlfriend and the ways his relationship 
reminded him of patterns in his own family, his voice would occasionally quiver, or his 
eyes would grow moist. When I pointed these things out to him, D initially became self- 
conscious since he was unaware of them. Usually he would cough or run his hands over 
his face as if to wipe away whatever was there, and would shift the tack of our 
conversation to another subject.  However, as D and I got to know each other better and 
established increasing trust, I began to ask him what it was like for him in the moment to 
share his emotions with me. While this question initially appeared to make D anxious, 
over the course of the semester he began to feel that this was a new and valuable 
experience for him.  
This process can be understood as an embodiment of what Sullivan called the 
empathy anxiety gradient between patient and therapist (1953). Expressing and 
experiencing affective states that D usually avoided increased his anxiety, but not to the 
degree that that therapy itself became unsafe for D, threatening what Winnicott (1963) 
called the therapeutic holding environment. 
 Paul Wachtel (2011) theorizes this process in therapy as a form of exposure. He 
writes: 
In the process of promoting insight, or interpreting (and hence 
interrupting) defenses that keep the patient out of touch with his 
experience, a successful psychodynamic therapy brings the patient into 
closer contact with the experiences that have been warded off. The patient 
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thinks the thoughts and feels the feelings that he previously avoided – or 
put differently he is exposed to them. . . . Interpretation and self-
knowledge do contribute to the process, but something else that is very 
important is also involved. The process of change proceeds to a significant 
degree through direct experience. . . . What we know about exposure as a 
general process suggests that usually it is necessary for the patient to 
experience repeated exposure for the anxiety to begin to significantly 
diminish (Wachtel, 2011, p.11). 
Early in his career, Wachtel worked closely with cognitive behavioral therapists, and he 
views exposure as a methodology common to both psychodynamic therapy and CBT, 
suggesting that the theoretical boundaries dividing different practices are not as rigid as 
they appear.  While I consciously used elements of CBT with a couple of other patients 
experiencing anxiety, I did not do so with D. However, Wachtel’s description of the 
process of exposure and therapeutic change aptly describes some of the key elements that 
occurred with D. As we continued our work together and D was repeatedly exposed to 
affects that he previously avoided, these parts of himself became more integrated into his 
self-experience, reducing his anxiety around their expression. It is useful to point out here 
that the splitting of powerful affects that define Klein’s schizoid phase are further 
integrated by the ego though an empathy anxiety gradient around affective expression 
that also occurs over time in the therapeutic process. (Again, the organizing frame of 
intrapsychic processes can usefully be understood within a relational matrix and not as 
drive derivatives.) 
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At the outset of Wachtel’s article, he explicitly writes about the difference 
between writing about therapy as if looking down on a landscape from “30,000 feet” 
where the “contours” of the relationship are “easy to grasp” in contrast to the actual 
experience of doing therapy -- the view from “ground level” in which the experience is 
far more complicated, “unpredictable” and “confusing” (2011, p.3). If this is not 
occurring, than something important is in fact missing from therapy. The process of 
writing about D or any individual in treatment inherently imposes a retroactive order and 
meaning that is not wholly consistent with the embedded and often confusing nature of 
the therapeutic process itself. Wachtel provides transcriptions of his sessions so that the 
reader can see the therapy from ground level “warts and all” (2011, p.3). There is not the 
room here to do this, nor does a composite case study make this possible. More 
importantly, transcriptions and language alone cannot capture the experiential nature of 
therapy.  Along with language, therapy is transacted through the body, through pre-
syntactic non-verbal communication, and an experience of empathic connection that 
language can only grasp at. Thus, no representation can ever really be at ground level, 
and though I strive in this section to capture the collaborative quality and texture of the 
relational matrix in therapy, this discussion is at best an approximation of experience. 
As I sat in session with D, at times I found myself feeling uncharacteristically 
tired and a little removed. D’s s rapid, concrete, and anxious style of communicating 
carried me along on what I came to think of as a kind of ride on a raft above constantly 
moving waters in which we avoided or had limited access to his emotions. As he sat on 
the edge of his seat, filling the silence, there were moments when I experienced what I 
can only describe as mild dissociation in which I could not anchor our shared experience 
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in any affect other than an experience of anxious avoidance. Yet there were always 
moments in each session, which increased in frequency and duration as we worked 
together, when D slowed down, when he stopped and tried to clearly articulate and 
experience what he was feeling. His reaction of coughing and wiping his face when his 
eyes softened and he appeared to be feeling various affects became a signal for us to slow 
down. I made this transparent in our process together, asking D directly if it would be 
useful for him if I pointed out these moments so that we could slow down and explore 
what he was experiencing. D agreed that this would be helpful, and in this way we 
devised one entry point by which to explore D’s affects.  
Just as I experienced in my body the kind of dissociative states that D brought 
into the room, I also experienced moments of deep empathic connection to him in which 
my own eyes softened and become tearful, or where I would laugh or smile along with 
him. Sometimes I felt sadness and compassion or anger as we sat together, even when D 
did not appear to be accessing these affective states himself. This suggests projective 
identification, but rather than viewing this is a defense, projective identification may also 
serve the adaptive function in therapy of allowing the therapist to inhabit affective 
experience that cannot in the moment be accessed through language by the patient, so 
that he or she is no longer alone. No doubt my affective responses were translated 
through my own non-verbal communications either in tone of voice, body language, 
posture, and facial expressions that were a genuine reaction to what I felt in the moment. 
This further mirrored and exposed D’s affective experience. 
Although Sullivan used the idea of empathic linkage to describe the ways that 
mothers deposit anxiety into their children, this concept might also be applied to the 
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multitude of affective states that are constantly passed back and forth between therapist 
and patient through empathic attunement and the avenues by which this is expressed. As 
Beebe points out in her work with adults, which draws on her experiences with infants, 
non-verbal forms of communication tap into pre syntactic brain functions that help the 
patient integrate and regulate their own affective experiences (Beebe et al, 2005).  
Over time I came to think of D’s rapid, often affectless speech as a socially 
acceptable replacement for strong affects, and as a means of integrating himself into 
America in a way that his father did not. Several times in our therapy, D wondered aloud 
if he would become like his father in the ways his father was silent and struggled to 
connect with others. In this respect, I understood D’s rapid, anxious speech as an attempt 
to connect, to fill in the silence, and to create a different identity than his father, 
particularly when he could not express emotion more directly.  Paradoxically, the desire 
to connect and to differentiate himself from his father at the developmental crossroads of 
early adulthood, also recreated a different form of disconnection from others. 
My bodily experience of tiredness and being at an emotional remove that 
sometimes occurred in our sessions can be understood within Bromberg’s formulation as 
shared disassociated self states. Bromberg (1998) specifically speaks of self-states 
disassociated through trauma, so that adaptive disassociation becomes a defense that 
protects self-representation from affects too threatening to integrate into the illusion of a 
unitary self. The emotions or self-states that D split or experienced as too threatening 
within his relational matrix were thus surrounded by inexplicable anxiety in the present 
which did not appear to be attached to any overt cause. This led to the self-understanding 
that I saw in many patients including D -- namely that like D they were, by nature, very 
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anxious people since there often was no apparent causal explanation for the degree of 
their anxiety. 
Enactment 
As we met over the course of that first semester, D reported that he was feeling 
less anxious in his classes. Likewise he made several friends in his residence with whom 
he now regularly ate meals. As he grew up, D’s family moved to several different towns 
where they were the only Moroccans. The time D spent alone in his room on his 
computer mirrored the kind of cultural isolation his family experienced in these towns. 
D‘s two new friends in his residence were first generation Korean-Americans, and though 
D did not say so directly, I assumed that this was part of their connection at a 
predominantly white college. Upon his return from the winter break, D seemed excited 
for the new semester, and had seemingly cracked some of his social anxiety and isolation 
through contact with his new friends.  
At this time, my own caseload increased significantly as more and more students 
sought counseling. In its mission statement, the counseling center states that they are a 
brief treatment clinic. Although many clinicians in the system see patients longer term, 
some of the staff only work within a brief treatment model. Likewise many therapists 
there see patients every other week in order to fit everyone into their packed schedule. As 
my own caseload mounted and I felt some anxiety as an intern about how I would 
manage, I reevaluated whether weekly therapy was possible with some patients who were 
not suicidal or in some other more imminent crisis. Since D seemed to be less isolated 
and anxious than when he entered therapy, I decided to ask him if he would be willing to 
meet every other week due to mounting demands within the system. D said that he 
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understood my position and agreed without hesitation to switch over to bi-weekly 
meetings.  
In our first biweekly session, I did not notice any particular difference in D’s 
presentation or the way he related to me. However, over the next two sessions, D reported 
that he was once again experiencing panic attacks in class. His heart raced, and he 
sweated profusely. This had happened to him in the past, but not in recent months. In our 
third biweekly session, I asked D what he was experiencing in these moments, and he 
said that he felt totally alone while surrounded by the people in his class. As we spoke of 
this experience and how to address it, I felt somewhat powerless, perhaps an expression 
of the way D himself felt when experiencing these panic attacks. I also felt increasingly 
disconnected from D. Coupled with a sense of powerlessness in the face of his panic 
attacks, I offered D some concrete ways by which he could try to soothe himself and to 
reduce his panic. Together, in the office, we practiced diaphragmatic breathing, 
something I did when I was on call and spoke on the phone or met with students who 
were experiencing intense anxiety and panic. Likewise borrowing from some of the CBT 
I had done with a couple of other patients, we explored D’s thoughts leading up to and 
during his panic attacks. Then we explored alternative thoughts that might soothe him. 
While D gamely joined me in these exercises, I could not help feeling like they missed 
the point. Looking back, I can see that I felt guilty for reducing our contact, and it made 
me feel better to offer him a concrete solution even if it was not helpful to him. At the 
end of the session, as I pulled out my appointment book, I asked D whether it might be 
helpful to meet in a week, and he said that he thought it would. As he stood up to leave, I 
asked him whether it was hard for him to meet less frequently, and he immediately told 
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me that it was harder to maintain a sense of connection. A look flashed across his face 
that I had not seen before, but that I understood as barely concealed anger. 
In our next session, I asked D more about how he felt about meeting bi-weekly. 
He reiterated that it was hard to stay connected with me, and I asked him why he did not 
say something about this sooner. He said that there was no reason for him to feel this way 
since it was not my fault but the demands of my schedule at the counseling center. It 
became clear that D felt he had no right to feel angry or hurt by my decision since it was 
out of his and my control.  In this moment, it also became clear to me that together we 
enacted something very powerful for D. Throughout his childhood as D’s family moved 
from place to place and when his father ultimately left, D had no agency. Whatever D felt 
made no difference, since it did not change the outcome. I asked D if he ever would have 
told me how he felt about meeting bi weekly if I had not brought it up. He said that he 
probably would not since it was out of his control, and therefore his feelings about it did 
not matter. I apologized to D for not thinking through what this change might mean for 
him. I apologized for hurting him, and as we sat in this session, D seemed more present 
than he had in weeks.  
Over the course of the following week, I talked in supervision about what led me 
to reduce our contact, and realized that it was not only the demands of the system and my 
anxiety about managing it. I realized that D’s limited affective expression in our sessions 
left me feeling uncertain about the importance of our work together and how he felt about 
it.  In a sense, like his girlfriend, I did not know what D really felt, and this created a lack 
of connection and understanding in me. In our next session, I was transparent about all of 
this. As the words left my lips, I realized that when I detected a slight quiver in D’s voice 
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or his eyes appeared to soften this was the most that he could express. While I could 
argue that my decision to decrease our time was simply my inexperience as a therapist, 
this is at best a partial truth. Within his raft ride style of communicating, moments of 
emotion, no mater how brief, lost some of their meaning and impact on me. Just as D did 
not let himself get too attached to his friends as he grew up, I did not let myself fully 
experience the attachment between us that had grown over the months. D acknowledged 
that he did not express to people what they meant to him, and he realized that he had 
done the same in our therapy.   
It is important to observe here that D’s “anxiety symptoms” escalated after the 
reduced contact following our switch to a biweekly schedule. It is also useful to 
understand what occurred in our therapy and in this particular enactment within an 
attachment framework. Bowlby understood separation anxiety as the corollary to 
attachment. Indeed our increased separation heightened D’s anxiety, and it could be 
argued that this experience activated the “primary anxiety”, that within Bowlby’s 
attachment framework, is an evolutionarily adaptive part of every infant’s development. 
While I do not know specifically if D suffered any particular attachment “trauma” with 
his mother as an infant, this is not the important issue.  Rather, D’s case powerfully 
illustrates the highly adaptive function of attachment, and that if attachment behavior is 
interrupted or compromised in any way, the kind of primary anxiety that Bowlby 
describes, cannot be successfully comforted. While I am not arguing that adult and infant 
attachment fulfill the exact same needs, they operate along similar adaptive patterns; 
attachment behaviors that structure caregivers and children remain the foundation for 
human development and connection, and this is no less true in therapy than in any other 
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relationship. Paradoxically the forced separation and anxiety that followed the shift to 
biweekly sessions with D, generated the adaptive anxiety that signaled the need to 
connect, to reaffirm our attachment and all the comfort, safety and validation that comes 
along with this very human process and need. Paradoxically the rupture that occurred 
within our attachment provided the opportunity for repair. This allowed to D to 
experience a traumatic childhood relational pattern in a connected and less anxiety-
producing manner. 
In this same session, I raised the issue of our impending termination since there 
was only three weeks left of the semester. D expressed sadness and anxiety about 
terminating, stating that he was anxious about feeling “all alone again.” I told D how 
much I would miss him, and that if we worked under different circumstances within a 
different system, I would love to continue working with him.  As we spoke about 
termination, D’s eyes began to well up, and for the first time all year he began to cry. For 
a time, he could not stop. He said that the only other time he cried like this was while he 
read a book in which the main character’s father leaves. He also stated that he was afraid 
of crying like this because he could not stop or control it.  
Here Winnicott’s notion of fear of breakdown offers another useful lens through 
which to understand this moment. D’s experience of these powerful affects was not 
necessarily frightening or overwhelming because they were new; rather D’s fear of a loss 
of control is also a re-experiencing of psychic deaths that already occurred. While 
Winnicott specifically theorizes “fear of breakdown” in relation to psychotic patients, 
Winnicott’s formulation also suggests the broader fear of a fragmentation of self-
experience and fear of isolation that reenacts traumatic ruptures in past relationships. 
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Here, the fear of breakdown could perhaps more usefully be framed as a fear of being 
alone, a loss of connection to caregivers, or put more succinctly, the fear of traumatic 
disruptions to attachment that recapitulate previous traumas.  
At our next session, as we continued to process our impending termination, D 
cried again in the same manner, and it was as if all the sadness, loss around disrupted 
attachments, and missed connections that he had experienced for years was with us in the 
room. For what was perhaps the first time all year, D leaned back in his chair and 
remained silent for some time as the tears came down his cheeks. D then expressed some 
confusion, fear, and embarrassment about his display of emotion. I told him that the 
effect of his disclosure and emotional honesty is that it drew me closer to him, and that I 
felt even more deeply connected to him as a person. There is no theory or transcription 
that can capture what this session was like. I can’t help but wonder if one of the only 
termination points for anxiety is through a strong loving connection to another person.  
In the two weeks between these sessions, D began to express more emotion with 
his two new friends and stopped worrying so much about how they would respond or 
whether they really wanted to be friends with him. He felt the onset of a panic attack in 
one of his classes, but he said that he felt less alone and was able to calm himself to some 
extent. While I do not think D was “cured of anxiety” as a symptom, I do believe that 
through our relational matrix, D was able to alter his self experience in relationships, 
which reduced his anxiety.  Likewise, without anxiety as a dynamic force in the process 
of affective exposure and change, treatment would at best remain a conversation like 
many others, stripped of an important element in the process of change. 
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It is very possible that focused CBT may have reduced D’s level of anxiety just as 
much, if not more so than a relational approach. But the value of anxiety reduction as a 
goal of treatment is not really a worthwhile abstract discussion, since as this case 
illustrates, anxiety does not exist as a separate entity apart from other relational 
experiences and systems. While there is no way to manualize a relational approach or to 
say that a diminishment of symptoms will occur in some set time frame in order to 
appease an insurance company or the systemic demands of a given clinical setting, there 
is little question to my mind that unless a patient has a distinct biological/genetic 
predisposition for anxiety, anxiety symptoms, at least as they appeared in the vast 
majority of college students that I saw over the course of the academic year, always exist 
within a relational context. Medicating these symptoms or providing time limited more 
prescriptive therapies such as CBT helps some patients, as it did several of my own.  But 
to medicalize anxiety as a disorder and to primarily treat it as an isolated symptom to be 
eradicated, is a willful distortion of experience that eliminates treatment options that 
clearly offer long lasting, satisfying and comprehensive outcomes even if they do not 
work within the systemic and “empirical” prescriptions of a medical model.  
As my work with D also illustrates, systems and the ways that individuals are 
inextricably interwoven with them, shape the relational matrix that structures every 
treatment, no matter the context. However, when systemic and socio-economic demands 
determine treatment without recourse to an open, collaborative and comprehensive 
assessment of an individual’s needs, a great deal is lost. I am happy that D and I were 
able to repair a rupture that was in part generated by systemic demands. For many people, 
especially those without certain kinds of social status and privilege, systems often 
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become even more rigid and hierarchical reflecting imperatives that have little to do with 
individual need or the needs of an entire community as is often the case. I hope that my 
work with D helps stress the need for assessment, collaboration and treatment that is not 
rigid, prescriptive or bound by allegiance to any one theory, but is responsive to the full 
complexity of each person’s experience. 
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Conclusion  
This study has traced some of the main psychoanalytic theories of anxiety and the 
ways that anxiety has been conceptualized within treatment, yet no one theory adequately 
defines what anxiety is, what are its functions, and explains whether it can be defined 
when understood in terms of discrete disorders. However, rather than offering a more 
“definitive” theorization of anxiety and its treatment, it might be more useful to talk 
about my experience reading all of the different theories that informed this work. There is 
not a single theory included in this study, which did not offer insight into anxiety and the 
conjoined intrapsychic and interpersonal functioning of the mind. As I immersed myself 
in each theory, I often felt that the writer was capturing something essential about anxiety 
and lived experience. For better or worse, since its inception psychoanalysis has offered 
totalizing theories and also sought to explain anxiety in a similar way, attempting to 
capture what is beyond explanation. Immersed in the depth of each theorization, I often 
found myself feeling as though it achieved its goal, and the working of anxiety in the 
mind and body was now manifest. But this always turned out to be an illusion endemic to 
powerfully articulated systems of thought. For as soon as I read a new theory, I often felt 
equally immersed and convinced.  
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As I hope my discussion illustrates, the explanatory power of different theoretical 
frames can always unlock new understandings, but no one theory can embody the “truth.” 
The premise of relational theory is that there are multiple, often competing truths. 
Meanings, ideas and experiences extrapolated through different theories can exist 
alongside each other without forcing an individual to conform to a certain theory or 
approach which rests on a truth claim about a phenomenon like anxiety, it functions and 
treatment. However, the fundamental premise of this study, that anxiety can best be 
understood and treated within the particularities of a relational matrix that is unique in 
some sense for each person, is itself a centering truth, but one that currently seems to 
offer the farthest and broadest view into the distance with the fewest obstructions.  
CBT and medication are also part of this relational landscape and are not 
antithetical to psychodynamic treatment. As Paul Wachtel argues, there is a great deal of 
overlap in some ideas, since at their core, every mental health treatment is in some sense 
relational. However, treatments that focus on eradicating or reducing a specific symptom 
like anxiety exist in an easy dialectic with the current medical model, and the very 
symmetry of this union can obscure all that it leaves out. This symbiosis also presents a 
particularly difficult challenge for substantiating the validity of psychodynamic 
treatment. Indeed the very structure of this thesis and the phenomenon chapter that begins 
it belies an inherent tension between psychoanalysis and the evidence based medical 
model. Within this dominant system, psychoanalysis must try to become systematized 
and prescriptive in order to render itself quantifiable and therefore viable.  Yet the very 
nature of psychodynamic theory and relational treatment presumes that a phenomenon 
like anxiety is not necessarily a disorder, and can also only exist within the idiosyncratic 
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relational matrix of each individual. This makes a prescribed treatment difficult if not 
impossible to delineate. In this regard psychoanalysis is left trying to produce evidence 
within an empirical classification system that runs counter to its very logic, a system that 
often ignores the contextual and personal nature of self-experience.  
There is little doubt that D experienced a great deal of intra psychic and 
interpersonal anxiety, but this took shape over the course of a life that was defined by 
relational experiences within various systems including his family and more broadly by 
his family’s particular experience of immigration to the United States, and the socio-
economic, cultural, and emotional impact that this adjustment had on them. Likewise in 
treatment with me, D’s anxiety did not exist as an isolated symptom but waxed and 
waned, and over time appeared to dissipate as our relational matrix unfolded, and our 
connection and attachment offered the space for new self-representation and experiences. 
No case study, series of case studies, or empirical study can make the validity of a given 
treatment approach generalizable for all people. However, the bias of this study is that 
every person’s experience is richly contextual and relational. Any treatment that willfully 
ignores this on the basis of “evidence” supported by a dominant paradigm, runs the risk 
of prioritizing systemic imperatives driven by socio-economic forces and ideology, over 
the needs of the individual and the communities of which they are a part. 
 
	   86	  
 
 
 
 
References 
 
Beebe, B., Knoblauch, S., Rustin, J., Sorter, D., Jacobs, T. J., & Pally, R. (2005). Forms 
of intersubjectivity in infant research and adult treatment. New York, NY US: 
Other Press. 
Blagys, M. D., & Hilsenroth, M. J. (2002). Distinctive activities of cognitive-behavioral 
therapy: A review of the comparative psychotherapy process literature. Clinical 
Psychology Review, 22(5), 671-706. 
Bowlby, J. (1960). Separation Anxiety. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 41: 89-
113. 
Breslau, J., Aguilar-Gaxiola, S., Kendler, K. S., Su, M., Williams, D., & Kessler, R. C. 
(2006). Specifying race-ethnic differences in risk for psychiatric disorder in a 
USA national sample. Psychological Medicine, 36(1), 57-68. 
Bromberg, P. (1998). Standing in the Spaces: Essays on Clinical Process Trauma & 
Dissociation. New York: Psychology Press. 
Craske, M. G., & Barlow, D. H. (2008). Panic disorder and agoraphobia. In D. H. Barlow 
(Ed.) , Clinical handbook of psychological disorders: A step-by-step treatment 
manual (4th ed.) (pp. 1-64). New York, NY US: Guilford Press. 
	   87	  
Ferrero, A., Pierò, A., Fassina, S., Massola, T., Lanteri, A., Daga, G., & Fassino, S. 
(2007). A 12-month comparison of brief psychodynamic psychotherapy and 
pharmacotherapy treatment in subjects with generalised anxiety disorders in a 
community setting. European Psychiatry, 22(8), 530-539. 
Flanagan, L. Object Relations Theory. In Berzoff, J., Melano Flanagan, L. and Hertz, P. 
(Eds). Inside Out Outside In: Third Edition  (118-157). New York, NY: Rowman 
and Littlefield.  
Freud, A. (1946) The Ego and Mechanisms of Defence. New York: International 
Universities Press. 
Freud, S. (1926). “Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety.” In S. Arbiser and J. Schneider. 
(2013). On Freud's "Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety. Retrieved from 
http://www.eblib.com 
Greenberg, J and Mitchell, S. (1983) Object Relations in Psychoanalytic Theory. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Kessler, R. C., Petukhova, M., Sampson, N. A., Zaslavsky, A. M., & Wittchen, H. 
(2012). Twelve‐month and lifetime prevalence and lifetime morbid risk of anxiety 
and mood disorders in the United States. International Journal Of Methods In 
Psychiatric Research, 21(3), 169-184. 
Klein, M. (1952) Some theoretical conclusions regarding the emotional life of the infant. 
In Envy and Gratitude. New York: The Free Press, 1975, 61-93. 
Knekt, P., Lindfors, O., Laaksonen, M. A., Raitasalo, R., Haaramo, P., & Järvikoski, A. 
(2008). Effectiveness of short-term and long-term psychotherapy on work ability 
	   88	  
and functional capacity--A randomized clinical trial on depressive and anxiety 
disorders. Journal Of Affective Disorders, 107(1-3), 95-106. 
Longmore, R. J., & Worrell, M. (2007). Do we need to challenge thoughts in cognitive 
behavior therapy?. Clinical Psychology Review, 27(2), 173-187. 
Mitchell, S. and Black, M. (1995). Freud and Beyond. New York: BasicBooks. 
Mitchell, S. A. (1988). Relational concepts in psychoanalysis: An integration. 
Cambridge, MA US: Harvard University Press. 
Salzer, S., Winkelbach, C., Leweke, F., Leibing, E., & Leichsenring, F. (2011). Long-
term effects of short-term psychodynamic psychotherapy and cognitive-
behavioral therapy in generalized anxiety disorder: 12-month follow-up. The 
Canadian Journal Of Psychiatry / La Revue Canadienne De Psychiatrie, 56(8), 
503-508. 
Schamess, G. and Shilkret, R. (2011). Ego Psychology. In Berzoff, J., Melano Flanagan, 
L. and Hertz, P. (Eds). Inside Out Outside In: Third Edition  (62-96). New York, 
NY: Rowman and Littlefield.  
Shedler, J. (2013). “Where Is the Evidence for Evidence-Based Therapies?” Retrieved 
from http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/psychologically-
minded/201310/where-is-the-evidence-evidence-based-therapies 
Slavin-Mulford, J., & Hilsenroth, M. J. (2012). Evidence-based psychodynamic 
treatments for anxiety disorders: A review. In R. A. Levy, J. Ablon, H. Kächele 
(Eds.) , Psychodynamic psychotherapy research: Evidence-based practice and 
practice-based evidence (pp. 117-137). Totowa, NJ US: Humana Press. 
	   89	  
Slavin-Mulford, J., Hilsenroth, M., Weinberger, J., & Gold, J. (2011). Therapeutic 
interventions related to outcome in psychodynamic psychotherapy for anxiety 
disorder patients. Journal Of Nervous And Mental Disease, 199(4), 214-221. 
Solem, S., Vogel, P. A., & Hofmann, S. G. (2010). An international comparison between 
different theoretical orientations of psychotherapy: A survey of expert opinions. 
The Behavior Therapist, 33(1), 1,3-7. 
Soto, J. A., Dawson-Andoh, N. A., & BeLue, R. (2011). The relationship between 
perceived discrimination and Generalized Anxiety Disorder among African 
Americans, Afro Caribbeans, and non-Hispanic Whites. Journal Of Anxiety 
Disorders, 25(2), 258-265. 
Stack- Sullivan, H. (1948). The meaning of anxiety in psychiatry and in life. Psychiatry: 
Journal For The Study Of Interpersonal Processes, 111-13. 
Stack-Sullivan, H. (1953). The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry. New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company. 
Stein, R. (1990). A new look at the theory of Melanie Klein. The International Journal 
Of Psychoanalysis, 71(3), 499-511. 
Watters, E. (2010). Crazy like us: The globalization of the American psyche. New York, 
NY US: Free Press. 
Welch, S., Osborne, T. L., & Pryzgoda, J. (2010). Augmenting exposure-based treatment 
for anxiety disorders with principles and skills from dialectical behavior therapy. 
In D. Sookman, R. L. Leahy (Eds.) , Treatment resistant anxiety disorders: 
Resolving impasses to symptom remission (pp. 161-197). New York, NY US: 
Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group. 
	   90	  
Wachtel, P. L. (2011). Psychotherapy at ground level. In Inside the session: What really 
happens in psychotherapy (pp. 3-31). Washington, DC US: American 
Psychological Association.  
Wachtel, P. (2011). Therapeutic Communication. New York: Guilford Press. 
Winnicott, D.W. (1963). Fear of Breakdown. In psychoanalytic exploration Cambridge 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1989, 87-95. 
 
 
 
 
 
